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I 
INTRODUCTION 
This article considers the history, interpretation, and constitutionality of 
statutory exemptions that preclude prosecution either for misdemeanor or 
felony violation of North Carolina’s criminal animal-cruelty statute, section 14-
3601 of the General Statutes, in nine situations.2 The beneficiaries include 
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 1. The statute provides: 
(a) If any person shall intentionally overdrive, overload, wound, injure, torment, kill, or 
deprive of necessary sustenance, or cause or procure to be overdriven, overloaded, wounded, 
injured, tormented, killed, or deprived of necessary sustenance, any animal, every such 
offender shall for every such offense be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. 
(b) If any person shall maliciously torture, mutilate, maim, cruelly beat, disfigure, poison, or 
kill, or cause or procure to be tortured, mutilated, maimed, cruelly beaten, disfigured, 
poisoned, or killed, any animal, every such offender shall for every such offense be guilty of a 
Class I felony. However, nothing in this section shall be construed to increase the penalty for 
cockfighting provided for in G.S. 14-362. 
(c) As used in this section, the words “torture,” “torment,” and “cruelly” include or refer to 
any act, omission, or neglect causing or permitting unjustifiable pain, suffering, or death. As 
used in this section, the word “intentionally” refers to an act committed knowingly and 
without justifiable excuse, while the word “maliciously” means an act committed intentionally 
and with malice or bad motive. As used in this section, the term “animal” includes every living 
vertebrate in the classes Amphibia, Reptilia, Aves, and Mammalia except human beings. 
However, this section shall not apply to the following activities: 
(1) The lawful taking of animals under the jurisdiction and regulation of the Wildlife 
Resources Commission, except that this section shall apply to those birds exempted by 
the Wildlife Resources Commission from its definition of “wild birds” pursuant to G.S. 
113-129(15a). 
(2) Lawful activities conducted for purposes of biomedical research or training or for 
purposes of production of livestock, poultry, or aquatic species. 
(2a) Lawful activities conducted for the primary purpose of providing food for human or 
animal consumption. 
(3) Activities conducted for lawful veterinary purposes. 
(4) The lawful destruction of any animal for the purposes of protecting the public, other 
animals, property, or the public health. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360 (2006). 
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medical researchers, persons raising livestock, hunters, and veterinarians. Even 
under the loose any-rational-basis test, these exemptions violate the equal-
protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions because many 
nonprotected actors have claims for exemption based on frequent contacts with 
animals. No matter what theory is employed to defend the existing exemptions, 
the claims of those with frequent contacts with animals are as strong as any 
claim to the exemptions found in the statute benefiting favored groups. 
Although the focus of this article is on North Carolina exemptions, the 
conclusion that they are unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment would apply to a large number of unqualified 
exemptions found in the criminal animal-cruelty statutes of many other states.3 
II 
HISTORY OF EXEMPTIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA ANIMAL CRUELTY LAWS 
North Carolina’s first animal-cruelty statute, enacted in 1881, contained one 
exemption, which was very narrow in scope compared to those found in the 
present statute: “[B]ut nothing in this act shall be construed as prohibiting the 
shooting of birds, deer and other game for the purpose of human food.”4 In the 
process of codifying the session laws in 1883, this hunters’ exemption was 
narrowed even more by adding the word “lawful” before “shooting.”5 What 
constituted hunting that was not “lawful”—so that the exemption did not 
apply—was laid out in chapter 21 of the 1883 Code, which included sections 
that prohibited hunting on posted lands,6 barred hunting wild fowl on Sunday,7 
created hunting seasons for deer and certain birds,8 and banned use of fire in 
hunting wild fowl.9 The hunters’ exemption was subsequently rewritten to 
provide that criminalizing cruelty to animals should not “be construed to 
prohibit the lawful taking of animals under the jurisdiction and regulation of the 
Wildlife Resources Commission.”10 This broadened the exemption in three 
 
 2. The nine exemptions are found in five subsections of subsection (c) of section 14-360, quoted in 
full in the preceding footnote. One reaches the total of nine exemptions by breaking subsection (c)(2) 
into five subparts: biomedical research, biomedical training, production of livestock, production of 
poultry, and production of aquatic species. 
 3. See Appendix. 
 4. N.C. LAWS ch. 368, § 15 (1881). 
 5. N.C. CODE § 2490 (1883). I am unable to find in statutes enacted by the General Assembly a 
grant of authority to codifiers to substantively change the statutes being codified in such a manner, but 
the General Assembly subsequently re-enacted this law with the word “lawful” in the hunters’ 
exemption several times, see infra notes 10, 27, and 29, thus confirming the validity of the insertion of a 
word at the original codification process.   
 6. Id. § 2831. 
 7. Id. § 2837. 
 8. Id. § 2832 (no hunting of “deer running wild in the woods” between February 15 and August 
15); id. § 2834 (no taking of “partridges, quail, doves, robins, lark, mocking-birds or wild turkeys” from 
April 1 through October 15). 
 9. Id. § 2839. 
 10. N.C. LAWS ch. 641 (1979). Subsequently minor amendments were made to clarify that the ban 
on cruelty did extend to birds, such as pigeons, that the Wildlife Resources Commission had the power 
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ways: (1) it applied whether or not the animal was killed for the purpose of 
eating it as food, (2) it was not limited to shooting but extended to trapping and 
other modes of capturing or killing animals,11 and (3) it extended to cruelty 
inflicted on inland fish and aquatic life because they are within the jurisdiction 
of the Wildlife Resources Commission.12 
In 1969, at the urging of private citizens and organizations, the General 
Assembly enacted statutes providing for injunctions to enforce the animal-
cruelty law—the civil enforcement law.13 The hunters’ exemption was carried 
forward in the new law. Two new exemptions were created that applied only to 
animal-cruelty enforcement in civil actions. The new exemptions “provided . . . 
that [cruelty] shall not include activities sponsored by agencies or institutions 
conducting bio-medical research or training or for sport as provided by the laws 
of North Carolina.”14 
In 1979, the civil enforcement law was amended to rewrite the exemptions 
for hunters, biomedical researchers, and persons involved with sports and to 
add two more exemptions: for “lawful activities for . . . the production of 
livestock or poultry, or the lawful destruction of any animal for the purpose of 
protecting such livestock or poultry.”15 The apparent reason for the General 
Assembly’s 1969 and 1979 enactments of new exemptions to the civil 
enforcement law, but not to the criminal animal-cruelty law, was that legislators 
worried that the civil law might spur unfounded suits by individual animal 
activists or avant-garde animal rights organizations. Activists might file a 
complaint against groups they despised, making unrealistic claims that the 
 
to regulate but chose not to. In 1998 the General Assembly added an exception clause to the hunters’ 
exemption: “except that this section shall apply to those birds exempted by the Wildlife Resources 
Commission from its definition of ‘wild birds’ pursuant to G.S. 113-129(15a).” N.C. LAWS ch. 212, § 
17.16(c)(1) (1998). In 2004 the exception was temporarily not in effect due to a holding that an 
implementing regulation promulgated by the Wildlife Resources Commission was unconstitutionally 
vague. Malloy v. Cooper, 592 S.E.2d 17, 22 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). The Wildlife Resources Commission 
soon rewrote the regulation at issue to solve the problem. 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE § 10B.102 (2005). 
For more details about the litigation leading up to the holding and revision of the regulation, see 
William A. Reppy, Jr., Citizen Standing to Enforce Anti-Cruelty Laws by Obtaining Injunctions: The 
North Carolina Experience, 11 ANIMAL L. 39, 45 n.30 (2005). 
 11. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-130 (7) (defining “to take,” quoted in text at infra note 34). 
 12. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-292 (authorizing Wildlife Resources Commission to regulate all 
fishing in inland fishing waters and the taking of inland game fish in coastal fishing waters); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 113-1323(b) (conferring jurisdiction over “wildlife resources”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-129(17) 
(defining “wildlife resources” to include “animal life inhabiting or depending upon inland fishing 
waters”). Note that due to the 1999 revision (see infra note 32) of the definition of animals protected by 
section 14-360 to exclude the class Pisces (that is, fish) from the scope of the basic animal-cruelty 
statute, the extension of the hunters’ exemption in 1979 to cover some activities of fishers became 
largely redundant. 
 13. This law now comprises sections one through four of chapter 19A of the General Statutes 
(entitled “Protection of Animals”). For the history of the civil remedies law, see Reppy, supra note 10. 
 14. N.C. LAWS ch. 831 (1969). 
 15. Id. ch. 808, § 2 (1979). 
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defendants’ practices were “unjustifiable,” as required by section 19A-1 of the 
General Statutes.16 
The criminal animal-cruelty statute included punishment only at the level of 
a misdemeanor until revisions in 1998 and 1999. The 1998 revisions added six 
new exemptions to the original hunters’ exemption as well as a felony provision, 
now subsection (b).17 The initial bill seeking to create the felony-level cruelty 
offense would have classified cruelty as a Class I felony if done “willfully.”18 A 
new subsection (c) was also proposed: 
c) In this section, the term “animal” shall be held to include every domestic or 
otherwise useful animal. This section shall not be construed to prohibit the lawful 
taking of animals under the jurisdiction and regulation of the Wildlife Resources 
Commission, lawful activities sponsored by agencies conducting biomedical research 
or training, lawful activities for sport, the production of livestock or poultry, or the 
lawful destruction of any animal for the purpose of protecting such livestock or 
poultry.19 
The drafter of this bill intended “this section” to refer only to subsection 
(b)—the new felony provision—and not to the entire section 14-360. This 
limitation is clear because the bill left unchanged the clause of the misdemeanor 
provision, subsection (a), making it applicable to “every living creature,” not 
just to useful domestic animals, and because the bill did not drop the hunters’ 
exemption from subsection (a) when restating it in subsection (c).20 
The House Judiciary II Committee substituted a revised version of the bill,21 
which was enacted by the House22 and sent on to the Senate the next day. It 
added a definition of “willfully” to subsection (b): “The word ‘willfully,’ as used 
 
 16. For example, the exemption for biomedical researchers might have been intended to protect 
them from suits brought by a supporter of the National Anti-Vivisection Society, a group founded in 
1929 whose “goal is the elimination of animal use in product testing, education, and biomedical 
research.” National Anti-Vivisection Society, About NAVS, http://www.navs.org/site/PageServer? 
pagename=about_main (last visited Sept. 9, 2006). For the suggestion that availability of an award of 
damages for committing the tort of malicious prosecution and of monetary sanctions under civil 
procedure laws should have been viewed by the legislators as adequate deterrents against the filing of 
such unwarranted suits, see Reppy, supra note 10, at 55–56. For a discussion of what acts of cruelty are 
“unjustifiable,” see infra text at notes 135–38. 
 17. “If any person shall maliciously torture, mutilate, maim, cruelly beat, disfigure, poison, or kill, 
or cause or procure to be tortured, mutilated, maimed, cruelly beaten, disfigured, poisoned, or killed, 
any animal, every such offender shall for every such offense be guilty of a Class I felony.” N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 14-360(b). 
 18. H.B. 1049, Gen. Assem., 1997 Sess. (N.C. 1997). 
 19. Id. (emphasis added). 
 20. The proposal that exemptions apply to felony prosecutions but not to misdemeanor 
prosecutions seems illogical. Why would the law excuse a crime involving cruelty to animals committed 
by a sportsman or researcher with the more culpable mens rea, while giving no relief to the defendant 
who performed the same act of cruelty with a less culpable mental state so that his wrong was only a 
misdemeanor? Logic would suggest that the less culpable actor is the party who merits some exemption 
from prosecution if an exemption is considered appropriate. Note that the proposed amendment would 
allow the prosecuting attorney to pursue the researcher whose mens rea was at the felony level on a 
charge of misdemeanor cruelty. 
 21. The Committee’s favorable report as to the substitute bill is referenced at N.C. HOUSE 
JOURNAL 774 (1997). 
 22. Id. at 842. 
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in this subsection, shall mean an act done intentionally, with bad motive or 
purpose and without justifiable excuse.”23 Subsection (c) was unchanged, 
indicating the House still intended the new exemptions to apply only to felony 
convictions. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee rewrote the bill to change the mens rea for 
felony animal cruelty from acts “willfully” done to acts “maliciously” done.24 
The revised bill applied the hunters’ exemption to both the misdemeanor 
subsection and the new felony provision25 and offered a list of animals covered 
by the felony provision rather than the category “domestic or otherwise useful 
animal.”26 It did not create any new exemptions. 
In the conference committee’s consideration of the bill, yet a fourth version 
of the rewritten section 14-360 emerged, replacing the House version of 
subsection (c). This version was ultimately enacted.27 Subsection (c) defined 
“maliciously” to mean “an act committed intentionally and with malice or bad 
motive” and made some minor wording changes but retained all but one of the 
House’s exemptions. The House exemption dropped was “lawful activities for 
sports.” The exemptions are introduced with the words, “However, this section 
shall not apply to the following activities . . . .” This language unambiguously 
directs the exemption both to misdemeanor prosecutions under subsection (a) 
and to felonies under subsection (b). There is no legislative history to explain 
why the adopted text departed from the House’s plan to grant exemptions only 
from felony prosecutions, although this position was also endorsed by a senator 
active in promoting a felony provision that would extend to all animals and not, 
as under the House version, just to domestic and other “useful” animals.28 
 
 23. Committee Substitute of April 30, 1997, H.B. 1049, Gen. Assem., 1997 Sess. (N.C. 1997). 
 24. This Committee Substitute in subsection (b) provided: “The word ‘maliciously’ as used in this 
subsection, shall mean an act done with bad motive, without justifiable excuse, and with the intent to 
cause physical pain, suffering, or death.” Senate Judiciary Committee Substitute of June 29, 1998, H.B. 
1049, Gen. Assem., 1997 Sess. (N.C. 1997). The favorable report of the Senate Judiciary Committee as 
to its substitute bill is referenced at N.C. SENATE JOURNAL, 2d Sess., at 228 (1998). 
 25. The bill’s subsection (c) provided: “This section does not apply to the taking of animals under 
the jurisdiction and regulation of the Wildlife Resources Commission” (emphasis added).  “This 
section” covered both subsection (a) misdemeanors and subsection (b) felonies. 
 26. Subsection (b) of the Senate Judiciary Committee Substitute would have applied to “any 
equine animal, bovine animal, sheep, goat, swine or other livestock, dogs, cats, and other animals kept 
as pets or mascots.” 
 27. N.C. LAWS ch. 212, § 17.16(c) (1998) (part of a 700-plus-page budget bill). 
 28. Some pro-animal organizations had expressed their displeasure with this feature of the bill 
enacted by the House. Glenna B. Musante, Animal Activists Want Bill Altered, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Raleigh), Apr. 6, 1998, at B1; Sen. Brad Miller of Raleigh Agreed to Help, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Raleigh), Apr. 6, 1998, at B1.  A later media report quotes Senator Miller’s words to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee in favor of enacting a law recognizing felony animal cruelty. According to this 
newspaper report, “Miller said the proposal excludes animals used in medical research as well as 
hunters and veterinarians.” Bill Would Stiffen Law on Cruelty to Animals, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Raleigh), June 26, 1998, at A3. 
That the General Assembly would exempt producers of livestock from the misdemeanor liability 
they previously incurred for acts of cruelty as well as liability under the new felony provision is 
surprising in light of the publicity during the time the legislators were considering amending the 
criminal animal cruelty statute to instances of disturbing cruelty to livestock. See Chatham Man 
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The final two exemptions in the criminal cruelty statute—bringing the total 
to nine—were added in 1999. They exempt “lawful activities conducted for 
purposes of . . . production of . . . aquatic species” and “for the primary purpose 
of providing food for human or animal consumption.”29 
III 
THE EXEMPTIONS ARE SO BROAD AS TO AUTHORIZE UNJUSTIFIABLE ACTS 
OF CRUELTY 
The exemptions protecting certain favored actors who interact with animals 
from prosecution for violations of North Carolina’s criminal animal-cruelty 
statute are denied to other actors who frequently interact with animals. Does 
this disparity violate principles of equal protection of the law, assured by the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the North Carolina Constitution? Whether there 
is a denial of equal protection is determined under the “any-rational-basis” test. 
As a preliminary matter, the scope of the exemptions must be explored. If 
they are narrow in scope, the degree of favoritism for the protected actors vis-à-
vis those not benefited by the exemptions can be seen as slight. Granting a small 
benefit to some actors but not to others who seem to be similarly situated may 
be more easily defended as rational than granting a far more substantial benefit. 
This question then arises: Are the North Carolina exemptions absolute? I 
conclude that they are; that is, they are within the scope of the favored 
“activities.” 
A. The Exemptions Are Not Based on the Status of the Actor 
The exemptions are not accorded to a potential animal-cruelty defendant 
based solely on his or her status but rather on participation in an activity. The 
veterinarian qua veterinarian is not exempt and thus could be prosecuted for 
tormenting his own pet dog at his home but not for doing the same act in 
connection with giving medical treatment to the dog. Similarly, a medical 
researcher who deliberately runs over a cat on the road on the way to work can 
be prosecuted for violating section 14-360 but not for torturing the cat in his or 
her research laboratory. 
There is as yet no case law that in any way helps define the scope of the 
favored “activities.” Because the original reason for the exemptions focused on 
felony cruelty prosecutions, including the malicious torturing of an animal, the 
courts must hold that the General Assembly intended “activities” to apply 
 
Convicted of Animal Cruelty, CHAPEL HILL HERALD, May 2, 1997, at 3 (sick and starving cows dying 
in ponds with bodies left to rot); Granville Man Faces 2 Charges of Cruelty, HERALD-SUN (Durham), 
Apr. 2, 1997, at C1 (three emaciated pigs shot to death); Crimewatch: Father, Son Charged with Animal 
Cruelty, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES, Apr. 15, 1998, at B2 (cattle tormented and deprived of 
sustenance). 
 29. N.C. LAWS ch. 209, § 8 (1999). This law also redefined the animals covered by section 14-360 
from “every living vertebrate except human beings” to “every living vertebrate in the classes Amphibia, 
Reptilia, Aves, and Mammalia.” 
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broadly;30 nevertheless, a common-sense approach would indicate some 
boundaries. Thus, a veterinary hospital employee who inflicts pain on an animal 
at the clinic for boarding and not medical care may likely be prosecuted, even 
though a large majority of veterinary hospitals also provide boarding services 
for pets. Similarly, under the “activities conducted for . . . providing food” 
exemption,31 a restaurant chef probably cannot be prosecuted for cruelly killing 
a duck he or she is about to cook in the kitchen but can be prosecuted for 
brutally kicking a cat that has strayed into the restaurant’s dining area, since the 
cat has no direct relationship to the cook’s preparing a meal. 
B. The Hunters’ Exemption May Have a Narrow Scope in the Temporal Sense 
The first exemption in the animal-cruelty statute applies to the “activity” 
described as the “taking of animals” regulated by the North Carolina Wildlife 
Resources Commission.32 The term “taking” is not defined in chapter 14, but a 
definition does appear in section 113-130, which applies to certain statutes 
regulating hunting, trapping, fishing, and the like:33 
To Take.—All operations during, immediately preparatory, and immediately 
subsequent to an attempt, whether successful or not, to capture, kill, pursue, hunt, or 
otherwise harm or reduce to possession any fisheries resources or wildlife resources.34 
These regulatory provisions do not by their terms apply this definition to 
chapter 14, which deals with crimes, but the General Assembly might have had 
this definition in mind when broadening the exemption in 1979 from “shooting” 
animals and birds to “taking” such animals. 
Assume “taking” an animal includes “an attempt to . . . harm . . .” an animal 
and that a licensed hunter, in season, shoots deliberately to wound without 
killing a wild animal merely to get a thrill out of watching it writhe in pain. The 
hunter has committed an unjustifiable act of cruelty, but the act of shooting 
would obviously be exempt from prosecution. On the other hand, section 14-
360 includes as part of the definition of “torture” and “torment” an “omission, 
or neglect causing or permitting unjustifiable pain.”35  The hunter’s failure to put 
the animal out of its misery arguably36 is such an omission, a violation of the 
 
 30. See supra text at notes 17–20. 
 31. N.C. GEN. STAT.  § 14-360(c)(2a). 
 32. Id. § 14-360(c)(1). 
 33. Id. § 113-130. 
 34. Id. (emphasis added). This definition was enacted in 1965, N.C. LAWS ch. 957, § 2 (1965), 
fourteen years before the General Assembly used the word “taking” in broadening the hunters’ 
exemption to the anticruelty statute. 
Note that if this definition of “taking” is read into section 14-360(c)(1), the hunters have the 
constitutional argument that there is no rational basis for restricting their exemption by limiting it to 
cruelty caused immediately after an act that triggers the exemption, when the statute imposes no such 
temporal limitation on the exemptions enjoyed by the eight other categories of actors favored by the 
exemptions provision. 
 35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360(c). 
 36. I would not expect the courts to construe section 14-360 as imposing on a hunter a duty to track 
down and humanely kill an animal he has wounded that remained mobile and hobbled away from the 
place where it was shot. (But see State v. Porter, 16 S.E. 915 (N.C. 1893), where a cruelty conviction of 
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cruelty statute that apparently extends in time beyond the period “immediately 
subsequent” to the “successful” effort to “harm” the animal. If courts thought 
the General Assembly intended to exempt such an omission37 from prosecution 
under the animal-cruelty statute, they would decline to hold that the word 
“taking” in the revision of the hunters’ exemption has the same meaning it has 
in the subchapter of the General Statutes dealing with conservation matters. 
The courts might turn instead to common-law sources for guidance in defining 
“taking” as used in the hunters’ exemption. There they would find definitions 
that did not include a strict time limitation.38 
On the other hand, a variety of a hunter’s acts of cruelty—punishable as 
both misdemeanor and felony—would be exempted if the section 113-130 
definition of “taking” were applied to the criminal animal-cruelty statute, 
despite its “immediately subsequent to” restriction. Under section 113-130, it 
seems that if the hunter sets out to make a live capture of a wounded animal, 
the time period of “taking” is extended until the attempt to capture is given up. 
Before doing so, the hunter may have passed up opportunities to shoot the 
fleeing animal to put it out of its misery. Likewise, brutally kicking a wounded 
animal at the time of capture would seem to be within the “immediately 
subsequent to” period of “taking” so that the hunters’ exemption would apply. 
Since use of the section 113-130 definition of “taking” in section 14-360 would 
not nullify the hunters’ exemption, North Carolina courts might find such 
borrowing to be logical. 
 
persons who owned pigeons released to be shot at during a pigeon shoot was apparently based in part 
on the defendants’ knowing some wounded birds would escape so they could not be put out of their 
misery.) However, I would expect the courts to impose the duty to euthanize an animal owned by a 
person (such as a pet) when the owner caused the suffering. The legislature surely did not intend to 
make a criminal of one who encountered a dog or cat someone else had injured if the person did not 
take the animal to a veterinarian. If a person captures a wild or feral animal, he becomes its owner. See 
Buie v. Parker, 63 N.C. 131, 134 (1869) (feral mule); State v. House, 65 N.C. 315, 316 (1871) (otter). I 
predict that if a hunter has wounded an animal so that it cannot move and the hunter approaches the 
wounded animal, then assuming a position quite near to it, he has taken possession and become its 
owner. That would also seem to be the case—the person taking a position very close to the animal 
would become the owner—even though someone else had shot and disabled the animal but then 
abandoned it. It would be reasonable to construe section 14-360’s provision that links failure to act with 
causing suffering to impose a duty on the finder who becomes owner to put the animal out of its misery. 
 37. Another fact situation involving cruelty to which the hunters’ exemption would not apply if 
section 113-130 is held to define “taking” in section 14-360(c)(1) is this: The hunter wounds a rabbit, 
squirrel, duck, or other animal, picks up the wounded animal (capturing it and ending any basis for 
arguing that the hunter is acting “immediately subsequent to” a taking), puts it in a bag, and perhaps 
hours later carries the bag home, jostling the still suffering but not yet comatose animal. 
 38. See State ex rel. Visser v. State Fish and Game Comm’n, 437 P.2d 373, 376 (Mont. 1968) (“The 
word ‘take’ [used in a statute regulating hunting] . . . indicates the process used to physically reduce the 
freedom of the animal—to pursue, hunt, shoot and kill the animal.”); Seufort Bros. Co. v. Hoptowit, 
237 P.2d 949, 952 (Or. 1951) (“[T]aking fish . . . is a continuous process beginning from the time when 
the preliminary preparations are being made for the taking of the fish and extending down to the 
moment when they are finally reduced to actual and certain possession.”). 
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C. “Lawful” Does Not Significantly Restrict the Exemptions 
All nine of the exemptions are facially restricted by the qualifying term 
“lawful.” The hunters’ exemption applies only if the “taking” of an animal is 
“lawful.” The veterinarian’s exemption can be invoked only if the “purpose” of 
the veterinarian’s activity involving cruelty is “lawful.” The public health 
exemption is available only if the “destruction” of an animal is “lawful.” Other 
exemptions apply only if the “activities” involving cruelty are themselves 
“lawful.” 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) has taken the position 
that an egregious act of animal cruelty is not “lawful” as that term is used in the 
exemption for production of livestock—a theory that would in most cases 
render each of the nine exemptions inapplicable to a prosecution based on 
similar egregious cruelty. However, the legislative history of the animal-cruelty 
act demonstrates that this argument is unsupportable. That history, bolstered by 
at least one maxim of construction employed to resolve ambiguities in criminal 
statutes, requires that “lawful” as used in the North Carolina exemptions means 
“otherwise lawful.” “Otherwise lawful” is a more precisely accurate term, and, 
in Arizona, it is used in the exemption provision applicable to cruelty occurring 
during an “activity” relating to “possession” or use of an animal during 
falconry, hunting, rodeos, ranching and training of dogs.39 “Otherwise” is used in 
the Arizona statute to permit acts and omissions that are unlawful solely under 
the animal-cruelty statute without any exemption.40 
1. How to Construe “Unlawful Purpose” in the Veterinarians’ Exemption 
A problem arises as to whether the “otherwise unlawful” construction can 
apply to the North Carolina veterinarians’ exemption when asserted to bar 
prosecution for felonious animal cruelty. This is because “lawful” in the 
veterinarians’ exemption qualifies not the “activity” of the actor but the actor’s 
“purpose” in committing an act or omission that constitutes animal cruelty. For 
instance, suppose a veterinarian reasonably determines that a pet brought in for 
treatment needs surgery, which the veterinarian performs unjustifiably without 
anesthesia, causing avoidable extreme suffering to the animal. The acts causing 
the pain—cutting open the body of the animal and removing, perhaps, a 
tumor—were done for the purpose of curing a health problem. The omission to 
use anesthesia probably had as its purpose saving money, arguably a “legitimate 
veterinary purpose.” Thus the exemption would bar a misdemeanor 
prosecution. 
Suppose instead that while being readied for surgery, the animal bites the 
veterinarian, who becomes enraged and punishes the animal by beating it 
severely. The veterinarian is charged with a felony violation under the North 
 
 39. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2910.06 (2006). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-4(e) (2006) (“conduct 
which is otherwise permitted under the laws of this state or of the United States”). 
 40. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2910.06. 
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Carolina animal-cruelty statute on the ground he or she tortured the animal 
with “malice or bad motive.”41  Because there simply is no “lawful veterinary 
purpose” for the act of beating the animal, the trier of fact would readily find 
malice or bad motive on which to base a felony conviction. It would seem that 
due to the malice and bad motive element of the crime, there could never be a 
lawful veterinary purpose for the act or omission that constitutes felony animal 
cruelty. 
Yet the legislative history of the Act strongly suggests that veterinarians, 
like the other preferred actors dealing with animals, are to be exempt from all 
felony prosecutions. To give effect to this intent, “lawful veterinary purpose” 
can be construed to refer to the veterinarian’s state of mind when he or she 
began to interact with the animal he or she subsequently subjected to felonious 
cruelty. In the hypothetical beating case, that initial purpose was to prepare the 
animal for surgery, clearly a “lawful veterinary purpose.” 
At the very least, the term “lawful veterinary purpose” is ambiguous when 
the issue is whether the veterinarian’s exemption can bar a felony animal-
cruelty prosecution just because the term is found in a list of exemptions 
worded in terms of “lawful activities,” meaning not in violation of any law other 
than the criminal cruelty statute. The rule of lenity, which requires ambiguities 
in a criminal statute to be resolved against the state and in favor of the 
defendant,42 counsels resolving this ambiguity in favor of the construction 
enabling a veterinarian, along with the other preferred actors, to benefit from 
an exemption against felony cruelty prosecutions. 
2. PETA’s Interpretation of “Lawful” as Applied to the Agribusiness 
Exemption 
In February 1999, an investigator for PETA sent to the district attorney for 
the district including Camden County five videotapes showing employees of a 
Camden County hog farm allegedly beating and torturing hogs with metal 
implements. The cover letter urged prosecutions under the felony provision of 
section 14-360, which had become effective on January 1, 1999, along with six 
new exemptions. The letter dealt with the exemption for livestock production as 
follows: 
The statute does not apply to “lawful activities . . . for purposes of production of 
livestock or poultry.” As you will see, the behavior of [the farm’s] employees does not 
remotely relate to lawful activities. In fact, it clearly violates the statute’s prohibition 
on malicious torture, mutilation, maiming, and cruel beatings and killings.43 
 
 41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360(c), quoted in supra note 1. 
 42. See State v. Smith, 373 S.E.2d 435, 437, 438 (N.C. 1988) (“[T]he general rule in North Carolina 
[is] that statutes creating criminal offenses must be strictly construed against the State”; “any ambiguity 
should be resolved in favor of lenity”); State v. Hanton, 623 S.E.2d 600, 606 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) 
(“[W]here there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, the rule of lenity requires court to interpret the 
statute in favor of the defendant”), citing State v. Boykin, 337 S.E.2d 678, 680 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985). See 
also United States v. Cotoia, 785 F.2d 497, 502 (4th Cir. 1986) (applying rule of lenity to North Carolina 
defendant in prosecution under federal criminal statute). 
 43. Pig Cruelty Exposed, http://www.meatstinks.com/pigcaselet.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2002). 
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Felony charges were filed against three employees working at the hog farm.44 
The attorney for one of the videotaped defendants said his client was “trying 
to kill the hog to put it out of its misery.”45 Euthanizing severely injured animals 
is certainly an integral aspect of production of livestock. It is surprising that 
defense counsel did not invoke the exemption. Instead, the two Camden 
County defendants pleaded guilty or no contest to misdemeanor charges.46 
PETA’s position in the letter to the district attorney seems to be that 
deliberate torturing of an animal could never be an aspect of “lawful” 
production of livestock, apparently relying on the theory that on such facts the 
defendant necessarily satisfies the evil intent requirement of the felony cruelty 
provision of section 14-360. But the “production of livestock” exemption clearly 
applies to the felony provison of section 14-360 and, as has been shown, the 
exemption was originally intended to apply solely to the felony provision. As 
enacted, it applies to felony as well as misdemeanor animal cruelty provisions. 
The list of exemptions is introduced in section 14-360 by the words “this 
section shall not apply to the following activities . . . .”47 PETA’s theory would 
rewrite this introduction of the exemptions to read “subsection (a) hereof shall 
not apply to the following activities,” reading the word “section” out of the 
statute so that the exemptions do not apply to felony prosecutions under 
subsection (b) but only to misdemeanor prosecutions under subsection (a).48 
3. “Lawful,” as Applied to the Original Hunters’ Exemption, Provides a 
Context for Its Interpretation 
When in 1883 the hunters’ exemption was restricted to the “lawful shooting” 
of game, the intent was to deny the exemption to a hunter whose act of cruelty 
occurred during hunting that was unlawful under certain hunting regulations in 
the 1883 Code.49 Applying the same reasoning today, it seems clear that 
“lawful,” as applied to hunters, trappers, and fishers, means their “taking” is in 
compliance with statutes such as those that require the hunter to be licensed,50 
that restrict hunting of many animals to a specified season and to permissible 
 
 44. Jeffrey S. Hampton, 3 Indicted in Hog Case: PETA Investigation Leads to Charges of Cruelty to 
Animals, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, Va.), July 7, 1999, at B1 (describing this as the first North 
Carolina prosecution for felonious animal cruelty). 
 45. Two Hog Farm Workers Sentenced for Beating Injured Animals, HERALD-SUN (Durham), May 
18, 2000, at C7. The attorney told the newspaper that ordinarily injured hogs at the farm “were killed 
instantly with guns that send a steel rod into the animal’s brain, but [the client] had run out of 
cartridges.” Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360(c) (emphasis added). 
 48. To avoid an absurd result, the term “section” at least once has been narrowly construed to 
refer to a paragraph and not the entire numbered section. State v. Scales, 90 S.E. 439, 441 (N.C. 1916) 
(interpreting statute covering inheritance tax). Scales is distinguishable because the legislative history of 
section 14-360’s exemption provision reveals an intent that it apply to felony prosecutions as well as to 
misdemeanor prosecutions, whereas legislative history was not referred to in Scales. 
 49. See supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text. 
 50. See N.C. GEN. STAT.  § 113-270.1B(a). 
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hours,51 that require use only of approved devices for taking animals,52 that 
impose on hunters a bag limit,53 and that bar hunters from trespassing on posted 
land.54 
Applying this “otherwise-lawful” reasoning to the other exemptions, the 
exemption for a bioscience laboratory or livestock-producing ranch is lost if the 
operation illegally has hired laborers in violation of laws to protect children or 
bar illegal immigrants, or if employees have not been paid legally mandated 
overtime remuneration. If the activity occurs in a structure occupied by more 
people than permitted by a fire code regulation, the exemption is lost, as it is if 
the structure or activity violates zoning ordinances. In the case of cruelty 
committed on a hog or poultry farm, there is no exemption if the waste lagoons 
are not in compliance with detailed regulations of the state for hog-waste 
disposal.55 If the cruelty occurs at a facility not in compliance with the federal or 
state Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations, the 
activity is not “otherwise lawful,” and no exemption can be claimed. 
In several states, exemptions to animal-cruelty prosecutions are qualified 
not by the term “lawful” but are restricted to “commonly accepted practices” or 
similarly worded qualification.56  There is no basis at all for construing “lawful” 
 
 51. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-291.1(a) (“between a half hour before sunrise and a half hour after 
sunset”). 
 52. See id. (permitting taking of game by rifle, shotgun not larger than ten-gauge, bow and arrow, 
dog, or falcon). 
 53. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-291.2, 113-135, 113-135.1. 
 54. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-285(a); see generally Mark R. Sigmon, Note, Hunting and Posting 
on Private Land in America, 54 DUKE L.J. 549 (2004). 
 55. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-800 through 106-805 (also known as the Swine Farm Siting 
Act), 143-215.10A through 215.10M (farm waste management system regulation, including poultry 
waste). 
 56. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.140(c)(3) (“accepted veterinary or animal husbandry 
practices”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-201.5(1) (“accepted animal husbandry practices”); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 53-247(b) (“generally accepted agricultural practices”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1325(b)(5) 
(“accepted veterinary practices”); FLA. STAT. § 828.02(9)(e) and (10) (“customary hunting or 
agricultural practices”; “recognized animal husbandry and training techniques”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 
711-1109(2) (“accepted veterinary practices”); IOWA. CODE § 717B.2(11) (“accepted practices” of 
research); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4310(b)(1) & (6) (“accepted veterinary practices”; “accepted 
practices of animal husbandry”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.102.1(C) (“accepted veterinary practices”; 
“accepted standards” of medical research); MD. CODE ANN. § 10-603(1) (“customary and normal 
veterinary and agricultural husbandry practices”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.50(b)(7) (“customary 
accepted animal husbandry or farming practice involving livestock”); MO. REV. STAT. § 578.007(8) 
(“normal or accepted practices of animal husbandry”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-211(4)(b) 
(“commonly accepted agricultural and livestock practices”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1013(4)(5)(7)(10) 
and (11) (“commonly accepted practices” relating to hunting, rodeos, farming, slaughter for food, and 
animal training); N.M. STAT. § 30-18-1(I)(4) and (5) (“commonly accepted . . . practices” relating to 
farming, ranching, and rodeos); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 959.131(D)(3) and (4) (“commonly accepted 
practices for the care of hunting dogs”; “use of common training devices”); PA. CONS. STAT. tit. 8, § 
5511(h.1) (“normal agricultural operation”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1-40(C) (“accepted animal 
husbandry practices”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-202(b) and (e)(1) (“accepted veterinary practices”; 
“usual and customary practices” relating to agriculture); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(h) 
(“generally accepted” conduct relating to hunting, wildlife control and animal husbandry); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-9-301(5)(a) (“accepted veterinary practices”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 351b(2) 
(“scientific research governed by accepted procedural standards”); WASH. REV. CODE § 16.52.185 
(“accepted husbandry practices” and usage in “normal and usual course of rodeo events” and 
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to restrict the permitted activities causing cruelty to animals to commonly 
accepted practices in order to save the North Carolina exemptions from a 
constitutional attack. 
An actor engaging in a commonly accepted practice of his profession that 
caused pain to animals would usually be justified in doing so and thus not in 
violation of section 14-360. In any event, no commonly accepted practice of an 
industry affecting animals is performed with malice and bad motive, elements of 
felony animal cruelty under section 14-360(b). Yet the legislature clearly 
intended the exemptions to bar felony prosecutions. That “lawful” creates an 
exemption far broader than “commonly accepted practices” in North Carolina 
is confirmed by the response of veterinarians and bioscience researchers to a 
bill that would have restricted the exemptions as they appear in the statute that 
parallels section 14-360 by calling for civil law enforcement via injunction.57 The 
exemptions to the civil enforcement statute are qualified by “lawful” in 
precisely the same manner that that term qualifies the criminal law exemptions. 
Senate Bill 699, filed during the 2003 session of the General Assembly, would 
have amended the part of the civil enforcement statute by introducing the list of 
exemptions with this new language: “This article shall not apply to the following 
activities conducted in compliance with commonly accepted practices.”58 
The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary I committee. When lobbyists 
for the North Carolina Veterinary Medical Association and for the North 
Carolina Biosciences Organization first appeared before that committee, they 
objected to the “commonly accepted practices” language, which was eliminated 
in the Committee Substitute Bill promptly adopted on April 29, 2003.59 
 
exhibiting animals at fairs); W. VA. CODE § 7-10-4(h) (“usual and accepted standards” relating to 
livestock, poultry, and wildlife); WIS. STAT. § 951.09 (shooting animals in accordance with normally 
accepted husbandry practices); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-203(m)(ii) (“industry accepted agricultural and 
livestock practices”). All of the foregoing statutes are quoted in the appendix to this article. 
 57. At the time Senate Bill 699 was filed in the 2003 session of the General Assembly, section 19A-
1(2) of the General Statutes provided: 
The terms “cruelty” and “cruel treatment” include every act, omission, or neglect whereby 
unjustifiable physical pain, suffering, or death is caused or permitted; but these terms shall not 
be construed to include lawful taking of animals under the jurisdiction and regulation of the 
Wildlife Resources Commission, lawful activities sponsored by agencies conducting 
biomedical research or training, lawful activities for sport, the production of livestock or 
poultry, or the lawful destruction of any animal for the purpose of protecting such livestock or 
poultry. 
The exemptions to the civil enforcement law are now collected in section 19A-1.1. Section 19A-1.1(2) 
eliminates any uncertainty in the language in effect in 2003, quoted above, as to whether the word 
“lawful” before “sport” also qualified “production of livestock or poultry.” 
 58. S. 699, § 1, Gen. Assem., 2003 Sess. (N.C. 2003) (emphasis added). 
 59. Memorandum to the author from P. Bly Hall, assistant revisor of statutes, North Carolina 
Department of Justice (Oct. 7, 2003) (on file with author). The Committee substitute bill, which was 
enacted and became law, also added the “lawful” qualification to all of the exemptions in the Civil 
Enforcement statute. See supra note 57 for the prior language that, probably, did not qualify with the 
term “lawful” the exemptions for production of livestock and poultry. 
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D. “For Purposes of” Must Be Broadly Construed and Does Not Significantly 
Restrict the Exemptions 
All of the exemptions except the first one for hunters, trappers, and fishers 
cover activities “for purposes” specified, such as raising livestock, biomedical 
research, veterinary practice, et cetera. The word “for” (as used in “for 
purposes of”) is a word with many meanings in the law, depending on the 
context. The interpretation most favorable to a holding that the exemptions 
have a rational basis—and thus do not violate equal-protection principles—
would render each exemption inapplicable unless the cruelty advanced or 
helped achieve the goal of the lawful activity.60 Under this interpretation of “for 
purposes of,” if a rat used in an experiment bit a medical researcher who 
became enraged and repeatedly stabbed the animal, the cruelty would not be 
exempt from prosecution. Similarly, suppose a farm worker, directed by his 
foreman to euthanize a sickly piglet unfit for human consumption, tortured it 
for several minutes before it died. The death itself would advance the purpose 
of livestock production but not the wasted time and energy devoted to torturing 
in lieu of instantly killing the animal; thus the livestock exemption would not 
apply. 
“For,” when coupled with “purposes of,” can mean “to advance the cause 
of.” However, “for” has also frequently been held to mean “arising out of,”61 
“growing out of,”62 “with respect to,” or “with regard to.”63 These broader 
interpretations of “for” are not per se negated by the fact that the words that 
follow are “purposes of.” If “for” is interpreted in this broad manner, the 
enraged medical researcher and the torturing hog-farm worker cannot be 
criminally convicted. 
In re J.A.64 is a North Carolina case in which the court construed “for 
purposes of” very broadly, almost as broadly as the concept of “in connection 
with.” The case concerned the application of a hearsay exception in the Rules 
 
 60. See Alexander v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 441 U.S. 39, 64 (1979) (determining that 
under statute providing relocation benefits after a HUD acquisition of real property “‘for’ a federal 
program or project,” Congress meant acquisition “must further or accomplish a program”); Aronberg 
v. Federal Trade Com., 1332 F.2d 165, 168 (7th Cir. 1942) (construing “for” to mean it would provide a 
cure, in determining whether advertisement that certain pills were “for this purpose” of dealing with 
the problem of female’s delayed menstrual period) (citing United States v. 11 1/4 Dozen Packages, 40 
F. Supp. 208, 210 (W.D.N.Y. 1941) (construing “for drunkenness” to mean “cure, mitigation, treatment, 
or prevention” of drunkenness, in regards to drug advertisement)); Robert V. Clapp Co. v. Fox, 178 
N.E. 586, 588 (Ohio 1931) (construing “for” to mean “with a view of reaching” or “[w]ith reference to 
the needs . . . of” when determining whether architect who drew up building plans was entitled to 
mechanic’s lien under statute referring to “material . . . for erecting . . . a . . . building”); Harris v. 
Cincinnati, 607 N.E.2d 15, 19 (Ohio App. 1992) (construing “for” to mean public had to benefit from 
project, not just that public agency own the structure, under prevailing wage statute for construction 
“for a public authority”). 
 61. Tomlinson v. Skolnik, 540 N.E. 2d 716, 720 (Ohio 1998), overruled on other ground in Schaefer 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 668 N.E.2d 913 (Ohio 1996). 
 62. Cormier v. Hudson, 187 N.E. 625, 626 (Mass. 1933). 
 63. State v. Consol. Va. Mining Co., 16 Nev. 432, 445 (1882). 
 64. 407 S.E.2d 873 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). 
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of Evidence for “statements made for purposes of medical diagnoses or 
treatment.”65  Suspecting their four-year-old daughter had been sexually abused 
by her babysitter, the parents took her to be examined by a physician, who 
found signs of vaginal and anal abuse. The next day, the child was seen by a 
social worker to whom the child made statements about how she had been 
abused by the babysitter. In delinquency proceedings against the babysitter, the 
social worker was allowed to testify as to what the child had said under the 
hearsay exception for statements made “for purposes of” medical diagnosis or 
treatment, because the social worker had coordinated her “findings with the 
physician to constitute the team’s medical evaluation.”66 The social worker 
herself was obviously not making a medical diagnosis or recommending medical 
treatment. Her purpose in talking to the child did not “advance” or “help 
achieve” any “medical diagnosis or treatment.” Her action was merely involved 
in the overall process of helping the child, that is, it was “in connection with” 
the medical diagnosis.67 
By its plain language, the section 14-360 exemptions provision gives little 
reason to select either the narrow or broad definition of “for purposes of.” The 
phrase is ambiguous. One solution to the ambiguity is to apply the rule of 
lenity68 and adopt the “arising out of” construction. Another is to declare the 
exemptions using the phrase “for purposes of” to be unconstitutionally vague, 
dismissing the cruelty charges against the first defendant who asserts the 
“arising out of” or “in connection with” interpretation. 
E. The “Absurd Result” Maxim Cannot Be Applied to Narrow the Scope of 
the Exemptions 
Because construing section 14-360 to invite a hog farmer, researcher, 
veterinarian, or other exemption-favored actor to maliciously torture an 
innocent and helpless animal with impunity would produce an absurd and 
unjust result, the maxim that a statute must be construed to avoid an absurd 
result could require that the exemptions be somewhat narrowly interpreted. 
The maxim is well established in North Carolina,69 but so is the rule of lenity 
maxim, according the defendant the most favorable resolution of statutory 
ambiguities.70 It would seem that the two maxims would cancel each other out if 
 
 65. N.C. R. EVID. 803(4). 
 66. 407 S.E.2d at 877. 
 67. In re J.A. will be distinguishable in many animal-cruelty cases in which the defendant invokes 
one of the nine exemptions. There, the social worker’s interaction with the child did not undercut the 
process of medical diagnosis. On the other hand, when a veterinarian, charged with treating an animal, 
causes it pain and suffering due to the infliction of cruelty, that activity is actually counterproductive to 
the task of the veterinarian. In such a case, “for purposes of” has to be construed as meaning “in 
connection with,” in the broadest sense, if the veterinarian defendant is to have the benefit of the 
exemption the North Carolina General Assembly intended to cast upon him or her. 
 68. See infra note 70. 
 69. See State v. Jones, 538 S.E.2d 917, 926 (N.C. 2000); In re Brake, 493 S.E.2d 418, 420 (N.C. 
1997); Best v. Wayne Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 556 S.E.2d 629, 634 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). 
 70. See supra note 42. 
09__REPPY.DOC 7/20/2007  9:38 AM 
270 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:255 
each were applied to the exemptions provision of section 14-360.71 But North 
Carolina courts would surely agree with the analysis of the Oregon Court of 
Appeals in a 1998 case72 concluding that the absurd result maxim has no 
application when the courts are clear as to what the legislature intended.73 
“[T]he legislative power,” declared that court, “includes the authority to write a 
seemingly absurd law, so long as the intent to do that is stated clearly.”74 
That the “absurd result” maxim actually does require a narrow construction 
of an exemption to an animal cruelty statute that in effect makes it inapplicable, 
despite its plain meaning, to felon cruelty finds support in an alternative holding 
in the 2000 Thomason case, decided by California’s Second District Court of 
Appeal.75 In that case, the defendants had made a “crush video” in which mice 
and rats were crushed and mutilated by the heel of a woman’s shoe worn by one 
of the defendants. Twelve animals were “taunted, maimed, tortured, mutilated, 
disemboweled and ultimately slowly killed.”76 The defendants were convicted of 
felony animal cruelty under a statute providing that “every person who 
maliciously and intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures, or wounds a living 
animal, or maliciously and intentionally kills an animal, is guilty of an offense 
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison . . . .”77 An exemption statute 
 
 71. The leading treatise on statutory interpretation notes that at one time courts employed a 
maxim that exceptions to the general operation of a statute were to be narrowly construed. 2A 
NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:11 at 245 (2000 rev.). But that 
approach has been displaced, and in general today “exceptions . . . are interpreted according to the 
usual criteria of decision applicable to other kinds of provisions.” Id. The old maxim appears to have 
survived in North Carolina only with respect to statutes strongly affecting public policies, such as open 
meeting laws. See Boney Publ’rs, Inc., v. Burlington City Council, 566 S.E.2d 701, 704 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2002); News & Observer Pub. Co. v. Interim Bd. of Educ., 223 S.E.2d 580, 586 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976). In 
other states, too, the maxim that exemptions are narrowly construed is generally applied only to 
statutes creating significant public benefits that would be restricted by the exemptions. See, e.g., 
Popplewell’s Alligator Dock No. 1, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, 133 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Ky. 2004) 
(exemption to obligation to pay a general sales tax); Dawson v. Daly, 845 P.2d 995, 1000 (Wash. 1993) 
(exemption to freedom of information statute). The same public policy would seem to explain the 
widely followed rule that exemptions in statutes that make a judgment debtor’s property liable to the 
holder of the judgment are given a “liberal interpretation.” 3A SINGER, supra, § 70:5 at 507. 
 72. Young v. State, 983 P.2d 1044 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). 
 73. The absurd result “maxim is best suited for helping the court to determine which of two or 
more plausible meanings the legislature intended. In such a case, the court will refuse to adopt the 
meaning that would lead to an absurd result that is inconsistent with the apparent policy of the 
legislation as a whole. When the legislative intent is clear from an inquiry into text and context, or from 
resort to legislative history, however, it would be inappropriate to apply the absurd-result maxim. If we 
were to do so, we would be rewriting a clear statute based solely on our conjecture that the legislature 
could not have intended a particular result.” Id. at 1048, quoting State v. Vasquez-Rubio, 917 P.2d 494, 
497 (Or. 1996) (emphasis added by the court in Young). 
 74. Young, 983 P.2d at 1048. 
 75. People v. Thomason, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 247 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
 76. Id. at 249. 
 77. CAL. PENAL CODE § 597(a). Note that “maliciously”—part of the mens rea for felony animal 
cruelty in California—is also part of the mens rea of North Carolina’s felony animal-cruelty provision, 
section 14-360(b), quoted in supra note 1. In addition, California defines “torture” in its animal-cruelty 
statutes in the same manner as North Carolina in section 14-360(c). California Penal Code section 599b 
say that “[i]n this title . . . the words ‘torment,’ ‘torture,’ and ‘cruelty’ include every act, omission, or 
neglect, whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain or suffering is caused or permitted . . . .” 
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provided that the California criminal animal-cruelty statutes (“this title”), 
including the quoted provision at issue in Thomason, were not to “be construed 
as interfering with the right to destroy . . . any animal known as dangerous to 
life, limb, or property . . . .”78 Both statutes were located in Title 14 of the 
California Penal Code, entitled “Malicious Mischief.” The defendants invoked 
the exemption on the ground that mice and rats are dangerous to life and limb 
because they carry diseases such as bubonic plague and hantavirus.79 The court’s 
initial holding was that only wild mice and rats carried diseases that were 
dangerous to humans, whereas those subjected to cruelty in making the video 
were domestic mice and rats bred to be food for other animals; such mice and 
rats were outside the scope of the exemption. 
The alternative holding is as follows: 
[E]ven if the bred mice and rats used by defendant could be classified as animals 
“known as dangerous to life, or property,” it is one thing to kill by traps or poison, rats 
and mice that run wild and create a health hazard, but quite another to intentionally 
and maliciously maim, mutilate, and torture the animals until they die . . . . 
Assuming Penal Code section 599c could be construed to permit the destruction of all 
mice and rats, wild or bred and domesticated, as deadly or dangerous or destructive, it 
does not permit defendant to intentionally and maliciously torture or maim or taunt or 
mutilate or wound or disembowel and kill any living animal in the process. As the trial 
judge stated, “it is my view beyond a reasonable doubt that what I saw on that tape 
was malicious torture . . . no animal, whether the animal is a deer or rat or a rodent, a 
mouse—no animal under the Fish and Game Code, or any other code, is subject to 
that kind of malicious torture that I saw.” 
Our construction of Penal Code section 597 . . . [provides] a reasonable meaning . . . 
and [is] a “construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the 
Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the 
statute . . . .” 
Even if the killing of mice and rats should fall within the exception to Penal Code 
section 597, subdivision (a), as set up in Penal Code section 599c, intentionally and 
maliciously torturing, mutilating, wounding, tormenting, and maiming the animals 
causes unnecessary physical pain or suffering before slowly killing them do not.80 
In other words, California’s felony animal-cruelty statute was removed from 
the scope of the exemption apparently in reliance on the maxim that a statute 
must be construed to avoid an absurd result. But the absurd-result maxim ought 
to be cancelled out in such a case by the rule of lenity, a point ignored by the 
California court. Thomason is also just wrong in ignoring the words “this title” 
 
 78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 599c (emphasis added). The full text of this exemption statute provides: 
No part of this title shall be construed as interfering with any of the laws of this state known as 
the “game laws,” or any laws for or against the destruction of certain birds, nor must this title 
be construed as interfering with the right to destroy any venomous reptile, or any animal 
known as dangerous to life, limb, or property, or to interfere with the right to kill all animals 
used for food, or with properly conducted scientific experiments or investigations performed 
under the authority of the faculty of a regularly incorporated medical college or university of 
this state. 
 79. Thomason, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 250. 
 80. Id. at 251–52. 
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in the exemption statute, which in very plain language extended it to the felony 
cruelty statute.81 
In any event, Thomason is distinguishable from the construction problem 
faced in North Carolina. The California exemption statute was enacted in 1905 
together with a provision rewriting the misdemeanor animal-cruelty law.82 
California first enacted felony provisions in 1972 by adding a subsection to the 
misdemeanor law without referring to the exemption statute. Thus, contrary to 
the legislative history in North Carolina, in California there was arguably a basis 
for concluding that the legislators actually did not intend the 1905 exemptions 
to apply to the 1972 felony statute. 
F. The Effect of the Exemptions Cannot Be Avoided by Prosecuting Animal 
Cruelty under Section 14-361 of the General Statutes 
Section 14-361 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides, 
Instigating or promoting cruelty to animals 
If any person shall willfully set on foot, or instigate, or move to, carry on , or promote, 
or engage in, or do any act towards the furtherance of any act of cruelty to any animal, 
he shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.83 
Although the caption, re-enacted as part of this statute as recently as 1993,84 
suggests the statute is intended to reach accessories before the fact of an act of 
animal cruelty, the statute’s plain language extends to the engaging in the act of 
cruelty itself. In the face of such specific wording, the caption, or title, of the 
statute cannot reduce its scope.85 
Although section 14-361 on its face contains no exemptions, a court would 
likely hold that the nine exemptions of section 14-360 are incorporated by 
reference because section 14-361 uses the term “any act of cruelty to animals.” 
Section 14-361 was enacted as section 6 of chapter 368 of the North Carolina 
Laws of 1881. Section 1 of that enactment was the basic animal-cruelty statute 
and contained a list of acts of cruelty including most of those found in section 
14-360 today, including to “overdrive, overload, torture, torment, deprive of 
necessary sustenance” and others.86 Sections 2, 3, and 5 of the 1881 enactment 
 
 81. “No part of this title,” the words introducing the exemption statute and fixing its scope, 
unquestionably embrace the words “maims, mutilates, tortures, or wounds” in the felony animal-cruelty 
statute. Both are in Title 14. 
 82. 1905 CAL. STAT. ch. 519, §§ 1, 2, at 679–81. Section 1 revised the basic misdemeanor animal-
cruelty statute; section 2 enacted eleven new statutes relating to animal cruelty, including section 599c 
of the Penal Code, the exemption statute. All the statutes were codified in title XIV of the California 
Penal Code. 
 83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-361 (emphasis added). 
 84. 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 2446. 
 85. See Appeal of Forsyth County, 203 S.E.2d 51, 55 (N.C. 1974) (“The law is clear that captions of 
a statute cannot control when the text is clear.”); Javurek v. Tax Review Bd., 605 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2004) (same).  At one point in the history of this statute, its title did refer to the act of cruelty 
itself. N.C. CODE § 2487 (1883) (“misdemeanor to instigate or engage in any act of cruelty to animals”). 
 86. N.C. LAWS ch. 368, § 1 (1881). 
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also described acts of cruelty.87 In context, the generalized reference in section 6 
of the 1881 enactment must have been intended to incorporate the specific acts 
of animal cruelty spelled out in the preceding sections.88 Moreover, the 1881 
enactment exempted hunting for food from the scope of the crime of animal 
cruelty.89 North Carolina law has long recognized that one statute can, when 
enacted, incorporate by reference a provision found in another statute, even a 
repealed statute.90 When in 1943, section 1 became section 14-360 of the 
General Statutes and section 6 became 14-361,91 “any act of cruelty” in the latter 
could readily be viewed as continuing to refer to those acts of cruelty laid out 
specifically in the statute immediately preceding it.92 By a parity of reasoning 
section 6 would have excluded wounding or killing an animal by one hunting for 
food from “any act of cruelty to any animals.” 
A court may not, however, use the doctrine of incorporation by reference to 
include the exemptions in section 14-360 in section 14-361. Section 14-361 was 
last re-enacted in 1993.93 Since then the hunters’ exemption has been 
substantially rewritten in section 14-360,94 and the other eight exemptions did 
not exist in any form until 1998 and 1999.95 Because the writings that constitute 
the exemptions now found in section 14-360 did not exist at all (or exist in their 
present form) in 1993, the doctrine of incorporation by reference is not 
available.96 If the exemptions were held to qualify section 14-361, then, because 
 
 87. Section 2 criminalized dog fighting and baiting, section 3 the failure to provide food and water 
to confined animals, and section 5 the cruel transporting of animals. 
 88. Section 14-363 today, as when enacted in 1881 as section 5 of the session law that also included 
section 14-361 and the original text of what is now section 14-360, punishes as a misdemeanant any 
person who “shall carry or cause to be carried in or upon any vehicle, or other conveyance, any animal 
in a cruel or inhuman manner.” This statute defines a particular act of cruelty; hence the term “cruel” 
used in 14-363 was in 1881 and is still today not dependent in any manner on the definition of cruelty in 
what is now section 14-360, which lists such acts as overdriving, overloading, torturing, and tormenting. 
For that reason, there is no basis for implying into section 14-363 the exemptions found in section 14-
360. Producers of cows and chickens can be prosecuted for cruel transportation of their animals on the 
highways of North Carolina and even from one place to another on the farm if a vehicle or 
“conveyance” device is used. Similarly, the term “animal” in section 14-363 should include fish even 
though section 14-360 does not cover fish. See infra note 99. 
 89. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 90. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 102 S.E.2d 853, 860–61 (N.C. 1958); Lutz 
Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores, 88 S.E.2d 333, 339 (N.C. 1955). 
 91. N.C. CODE (1943) (Michie). In the Codes of 1919, 1924, 1927, 1931, 1935, and 1939, what is now 
section 14-361 also immediately followed what is now section 14-360, the code sections being 4484 and 
4483. In the Code of 1883, however, two statutes did not adjoin but were section numbers 2487 and 
2492, with four intervening sections. 
 92. Whether “any act of cruelty” in section 14-361 continued to also refer to dog fighting, baiting 
and cruel transport of animals is debatable. The statutes creating the latter crimes were codified in 1919 
to follow rather than precede section 14-361, at least opening the door to the argument that section 14-
361 did not incorporate them by reference. 
 93. 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 2446. 
 94. See supra note 10, discussing a 1998 amendment that excluded certain birds from the hunters’ 
exemption. 
 95. See supra notes 19–32 and accompanying text. 
 96. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 102 S.E.2d 853, 860 (N.C. 1958), states that 
the writing to be incorporated by reference into a statute must be “existing” at the time of the statute’s 
enactment. This is consistent with application of the doctrine of incorporation by reference into a will 
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they were added or rewritten after 1993, the legal theory would have to be 
amendment of that statute by implication. 
Finding a statute amended by implication is “not favored,”97 and the 
doctrine will be applied only when legislative intent for an implied amendment 
is “manifestly clear.”98 It would seem, however, that even if legislative intent did 
not reach that level of clarity, the argument for amendment by implication to 
incorporate the section 14-360 exemptions into section 14-361 is strong enough 
to lead a court to hold that a potential defendant is not given the kind of notice 
required by due process of law as to just what conduct section 14-361 
criminalizes. Such a defendant could rely on one of the section 14-360 
exemptions as a basis for quashing a section 14-361 prosecution.99 
IV 
THE EXEMPTIONS DENY EQUAL PROTECTION TO PERSONS ENGAGED IN 
LAWFUL ACTIVITIES 
There are many “lawful activities” involving animals that would seem to 
have just as much claim to an exemption from cruelty prosecutions as the nine 
activities expressly exempted in section 14-360. Examples would include 
grooming services for dogs and cats, boarding kennels for pets, dog day-care 
centers, pet resorts,100 pet sitters, breeders of dogs, horses and pot-bellied pigs to 
be sold as pets, operators of rodeos and dog and pony shows,101 dog trainers, 
 
of writings existing at the time of execution of the will. See In re Estate of Norton, 410 S.E.2d 484, 489 
(N.C. 1991). 
 97. In re Halifax Paper Co., 131 S.E.2d 441, 445 (N.C. 1963); 1A SINGER, supra note 71, § 22:13 at 
292–95 (2002 rev.). 
 98. In re Halifax, 131 S.E.2d at 445. 
 99. On the other hand, North Carolina prosecutors may be able to invoke section 14-361—subject 
to the nine exemptions found in section 14-360—to prosecute a defendant for cruelty to some fish, a 
class of animal excluded from the scope of section 14-360, which since 1998 has defined “animal” as a 
vertebrate in the classes Amphibia, Reptilia, Aves, and Mammalia. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360(c).  See 
supra note 29. The fish that may be protected by section 14-361 are those not regulated by the Wildlife 
Resources Commission (see supra note 12 and accompanying text) and thus not within the expanded 
hunters’ exemption found in section 14-360(c), which apparently must be read into section 14-361. 
Section 14-361 still contains the original wording from its 1881 enactment that criminalizes an “act of 
cruelty to any animal.” Section 15 of the 1881 session law defined “animal” as used in what is now 
section 14-361—as well as what is now section 14-360—as “every living creature.” Because of that 
definition, the term “animal” in what is now section 14-361 did not refer to or depend on the use of the 
term in what is now section 14-360. I do not think it is at all “manifestly clear” that the legislative 
amendment shrinking the scope of “animal” was also intended to affect section 14-361, particularly 
since the restricted definition of “animal” refers to that term “[a]s used in this section.” N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 14-360(c). That should have alerted members of the General Assembly that the definition did 
not apply to the term “animal” in other statutes, including the one immediately following this section, 
14-361. Section 14-361 has not been impliedly amended, and the term “any animal” in it is not vague 
and still means “any living creature.” N.C. LAWS ch. 368, § 15 (1881). 
 100. See Travel Pets Home Page, http://travelpets.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2006). 
 101. They, like some others in this list are regulated by the federal Animal Welfare Act, but it does 
not  preempt prosecution of regulated activities under state and local anticruelty laws. See 7 U.S.C. § 
2143(a)(1) (2000) (The A.W.A. does “not prohibit any State (or a political subdivision of such State) 
from promulgating [animal protection] standards in addition to those standards promulgated by the 
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horse trainers,102 farriers (horse-shoers), operators of dog-rescue services, 
businesses that specialize in transporting animals,103 and pet stores that sell live 
pets. The only thing the nine exempt activities have in common is they often 
involve frequent contact with animals, but the same is true of these examples of 
nonexempt “lawful activities.” 
Since the exemptions in section 14-360 involve neither a suspect 
classification such as race or gender nor a fundamental right, whether they deny 
equal protection would be decided under the “rational basis test.” 104  This was 
the test used by the Supreme Court of Florida in one of the few reported cases 
involving the constitutionality of an exemption to an animal-cruelty criminal 
statute.105 The basic statute reads like North Carolina’s, providing criminal 
punishment for 
[w]hoever unnecessarily overloads, overdrives, tortures, torments, deprives of 
necessary sustenance or shelter, or unnecessarily or cruelly beats, mutilates or kills any 
animal, or causes the same to be done, or carries in or upon any vehicle, or otherwise, 
any animal in a cruel or inhuman manner . . . .106 
The exemption provided that “[n]othing in [the above-quoted statute] shall be 
construed to apply to poultry shipped on steamboats or other crafts.”107 
The court held that the exemption rendered the statute invalid due to denial 
of equal protection: 
Under these sections of the statute a person engaged in breeding and training game 
cocks may spend considerable sums of money . . . for pens and runs for his chickens, 
but if he permits them to get together in the back yard, or in a pen, or a run, where a 
fight results, he is guilty of cruelty to animals and is subject to a fine or imprisonment. 
On the other hand, he may be able to rent or buy a steamboat, or other floating craft, 
on which to ship his roosters anywhere on the waters of Dade County and not be 
guilty of cruelty to animals because of any fight which might take place on the 
steamboat or other craft. There is no difference between the fighting of roosters on a 
steamboat, or other craft, and the fighting of roosters on land, in the back yard or in 
the chicken runs. . . . Under the statute one is a violation of the law and the other is 
not. 
 
Secretary.”). Cf. Dehart v. Town of Austin, 39 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 1994) (municipal ban on exotic and 
wild animals not preempted by federal A.W.A.). 
 102. In September 2003 felony cruelty charges were brought in Harnett County against a horse 
trainer for beating a horse boarding at his facility. DUNN DAILY REC., Sept. 23, 2003, at D1. After trial 
in Harnett County district court, the defendant was found guilty of misdemeanor animal cruelty. A 
newspaper account of the proceeding states that the defendant was accused of beating a horse he was 
training with a shovel until the shovel broke. DUNN DAILY REC., Sept. 29, 2003, at D1. 
 103. Cruelty in the conveying or transporting of animals is made a criminal offense in a separate 
misdemeanor statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-363 (see supra note 88), and thus probably cannot be 
prosecuted under the felony provision of section 14-360. 
 104. See Texfi Indus. v. City of Fayetteville, 269 S.E.2d 142, 149 (N.C. 1980); State v. Howard, 580 
S.E.2d 725, 730 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (“[T]he test is whether the difference in treatment made by the 
law has a reasonable basis in relation to the purpose and subject matter of the legislation. A statute is 
only void as denying equal protection when similarly situated persons are subject to different 
restrictions or are given different privileges under the same conditions.”). 
 105. Mikell v. Henderson, 63 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1953). This was a declaratory judgment action brought 
by persons raising birds for cock-fighting. 
 106. Former FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.12, quoted in Mikell, 63 So. 2d at 509. 
 107. Id. 
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There is no reasonable basis for the classification of cock fighting on a steamboat, or 
other craft, and cock fighting on land or in the back yard. The discrimination is 
unreasonable and arbitrary and denies to the appellant equal protection of the law.108 
Several North Carolina cases have used the rational-basis test to hold 
exemptions in criminal statutes and ordinances unconstitutional as denying 
equal protection of the law to persons similarly situated who are not exempted. 
State v. Glidden,109 decided in 1948, involved prosecution under a statute that 
criminalized the polluting of waterways with substances deleterious to fish but 
that exempted “corporations chartered . . . before the 4th day of March, 
1915.”110 Affirming the trial court’s quashing the prosecution of a post-1915 
corporation because the statute violated the North Carolina constitution, the 
state supreme court declared, 
[A] statute or ordinance is void as contravening the equal protection guaranty which 
makes an act a crime when committed by one person, but not so when committed by 
another in like situation . . . or which makes a question as to whether a certain act is 
criminal or not depend on an arbitrary or unreasonable distinction between persons or 
classes of persons committing it.111 
Another equal-protection case applying the rational-basis test to statutory 
exemptions, Cheek v. City of Charlotte,112 was a suit to restrain enforcement of 
an ordinance that, among other things, made it unlawful for massage therapists 
to give a massage to a person of the opposite sex without an order signed by a 
physician. An exemption provision included the following: 
[N]or shall the provisions of this article apply to health club activities of the Young 
Men’s Christian Association or the Young Women’s Christian Association; nor shall 
the provisions of this article apply to duly licensed barber shops and beauty shops.113 
The North Carolina Supreme Court held the exemptions arbitrary and 
unreasonable: 
[I]t is clear that the ordinance in suit cannot withstand plaintiffs’ [equal protection] 
attack. There is no reasonable ground for putting barber shops, beauty parlors, 
Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. health clubs in a separate classification from massage parlors, 
health salons, or physical culture studios. Therefore an ordinance which prohibits a 
person of one sex from giving a massage to a patron of the opposite in the latter, and 
permits it in the former, makes a purely arbitrary selection. It “has no reasonable 
relation to the purpose of the law, only serving to mechanically split into two groups 
persons in like situations with regard to the subject matter dealt with but in sharply 
contrasting positions as to the incidence and effect of the law.” . . . 
Obviously, the city council felt that the activities which the ordinance seeks to 
eliminate were not then being carried out in the exempted establishments. 
Notwithstanding, as presently written, the ordinance prohibits the proprietors and 
employees of a massage parlor from doing acts which can be done with impunity 
 
 108. Mikell, 63 So.2d at 509. 
 109. 46 S.E.2d 860 (N.C. 1948). 
 110. Id. at 861. 
 111. Id. at 862. 
 112. 160 S.E.2d 18 (N.C. 1968). 
 113. Id. at 20. 
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under similar circumstances in a barber shop or any of the other exempted places of 
business. Such favoritism cannot be sustained.114 
The same is true of the state’s current criminal animal-cruelty statute. The 
act of unjustly causing pain to a dog can be done with impunity at a 
veterinarian’s place of business but not at a groomer’s place of business or a 
boarding kennel. And just because the General Assembly may have believed 
veterinarians in causing pain likely were not engaging in cruelty but a groomer 
or boarding kennel operator in causing pain likely was, the discrimination is not 
constitutional. 
In other equal-protection cases, the statute’s exemption flaw also involved 
classifications that had no rational basis.  In State v. Greenwood115 the owner of a 
billiard hall was prosecuted for violating an ordinance forbidding such a 
business to operate on Sundays. No other business was so restricted. The 
district court dismissed the action, holding that the ordinance denied operators 
of billiard halls equal protection of the law. The North Carolina Court of 
Appeals reinstated the prosecution, but the state supreme court reversed, 
agreeing with the trial court’s equal-protection analysis: 
The crucial question is whether, in relation to the purpose of the ordinance, there is a 
rational basis for placing billiard halls in a unique class, separate and apart from all 
other businesses which offer facilities and opportunities for recreation, sports and 
amusements. An affirmative answer would require that we hold that the operation of 
billiard halls on Sunday constitutes an interference with the peace and quiet of that 
day in a manner . . . different from the operation of other sporting or recreational 
facilities. To so hold would require us to disregard plain facts. Bowling alleys, dance 
halls, skating rinks, swimming pools, amusement parks, spectator games and sports, 
and similar businesses, no less than billiard halls, are potential gathering places for 
idlers and trouble-makers and potential centers for boisterousness, immorality and 
crime. However, all are facilities for wholesome recreation. In terms of the purpose of 
the ordinance, all are within the same classification.116 
Again, by the same reasoning, the act of unjustifiably subjecting an animal to 
pain is no less likely to occur in a research setting than in some not specifically 
exempted—no less likely in a biomedical laboratory than on the premises of a 
horse trainer. All businesses in which people interact with animals must be 
treated the same under the law. 
State v. McCleary117 held an exemption to a criminal statute banning lottery 
activity unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection, although that holding 
did not result in reversal of the defendant’s conviction. A defendant convicted 
of advertising and operating a lottery in violation of statewide statutes appealed 
on the ground that various exemptions to the anti-lottery statutes rendered the 
criminal prohibition a violation of equal protection. The exemption statute 
allowed raffles and bingo games to be conducted by an organization exempt 
from taxation if the organization was “a bona fide nonprofit charitable, civic, 
 
 114. Id. at 23. 
 115. 187 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1972). 
 116. Id. at 12. 
 117. 308 S.E.2d 883 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983), aff’d, 316 S.E.2d 870 (N.C. 1984). 
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religious, fraternal, patriotic or veterans’ organization, or . . . a nonprofit 
volunteer rescue squad or a bona fide homeowners’ or property owners’ 
association.”118 The Court of Appeals held that it was rational to exempt 
charities so that raffles and bingo could be used as a source of revenue for their 
activities that benefit the public. But the final two exemptions were invalid: 
The privilege to conduct a bingo game or raffle by private homeowner associations 
whose sole purpose is the landscaping of the common areas and facilities owned by 
such an association or its members has no relation whatsoever to the basic goal of the 
gambling prohibition or charitable exemption; these organizations do not have a 
general charitable orientation by nature, and are not required to so conduct 
themselves by law. The activity of homeowner associations conducting raffles to raise 
revenue for clubhouse construction or landscaping projects on their private property 
cannot be rationally distinguished from the activity of defendant conducting a lottery 
to sell a three bedroom brick home with oil heat or of any other private nonprofit 
group organized for its own self-serving purposes, which is also excluded by G.S. 14-
292.1 from conducting a raffle or lottery.119 
After quoting a severability clause applicable to the statute,120 the Court of 
Appeals held that the exemptions for homeowners and property owners 
associations did “not affect the other provisions of the act”—those under which 
the defendant had been convicted—and severed them from the statute.121 
Without citing a single case, it then affirmed the conviction. The North Carolina 
Supreme Court affirmed per curiam the judgment of the Court of Appeals.122 
The relationship of the McCleary defendant selling his own home via lottery 
and a homeowners association raising money for landscaping by holding a 
lottery is no less close than the relationship between a farmer interacting with 
animals raised for sale as meat products and the operator of a kennel who 
interacts with animals boarding there. In each situation, it defeats the purpose 
of the animal-cruelty law to exempt the unjustified infliction of pain on an 
animal from the criminal sanction. 
 
 118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-292.1, quoted in McCleary, 308 S.E.2d at 886. 
 119. McCleary, 308 S.E.2d at 896 (emphasis in original). 
 120.  
“If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held 
invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications to the act which can be 
given effect without the invalid provision or application and to this end the provisions of this 
act are severable.” 
 Id. at 897. 
 121.  Id. Nothing in McCleary suggests that a severability clause is binding on a court, and it is well 
settled elsewhere that such a clause at most praises a presumption that severability would be 
appropriate. E.g., Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1101 (Ill. 1997). 
Issues arising out of the affirmance of the conviction after unconstitutional exemptions are excised 
from a statute are considered in part V, infra. 
 122.  316 S.E.2d 870 (N.C. 1984). 
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A. The Denial of Equal Protection in the Animal-Cruelty Criminal Statute 
Can Be Judicially Cured Only by Excising the Discriminatory Exemptions 
1. A Court Faced with a Statute Containing an Unconstitutional Provision 
May Have Three Remedial Choices 
When part of a statute is unconstitutional due to its resulting in a denial of 
equal protection of the law by favoring one group—as by giving it an exemption 
or other benefit denied another group similarly situated—courts may remedy 
the problem in one of three ways: (a) by declaring the entire statute 
unconstitutional, (b) by severing the unconstitutional exemption and leaving 
the remainder of the statute operable, or (c) by curing the denial of equal 
protection by extending the exemption to those denied it by the 
unconstitutional legislation or by a modest redrafting of the language to make 
the classification rational. In the case of the unconstitutional exemptions in 
section 14-360, only solution (b) is available to a court. The exemptions must be 
excised and the main part of the statute creating misdemeanor and felony 
crimes of animal cruelty retained. 
2. Voiding the Entire Statute Is Not an Option 
Voiding section 14-360 entirely would leave North Carolina without any law 
regulating the overwhelming number of acts of animal cruelty that occur 
repeatedly in the state,123 an unacceptable result that is unnecessary given the 
alternative remedy of striking the unconstitutional exemptions. Guidance on 
the appropriate procedure to deal with the unconstitutionality of the animal-
cruelty exemptions is found in two decisions of the North Carolina Supreme 
Court. Constantian v. Anson County124 concerned a section of the state 
constitution requiring counties to fund the construction, maintenance, and 
operation of public schools. The section also contained a requirement that 
violated equal protection of the law—that such schools be racially segregated.125 
Certain litigants contended that unconstitutionality of the clause providing for 
segregated schools meant the entire section was invalid, so that counties did not 
have authority to issue bonds to fund public schools. The North Carolina 
Supreme Court responded, 
If [this] contention were adopted, all authorized (unissued) bonds for school plant 
facilities, as well as all previously authorized special tax supplements within 
 
 123. The following animal cruelty statutes contain no exemptions and would remain in effect: N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 14-361.1 (misdemeanor abandonment of animals), 14-361 (felony cockfighting); 14-362.1 
(misdemeanor animal fighting and baiting), 14-362.2 (felony dog fighting), 14-362.3 (misdemeanor 
cruelly restraining of dogs), 14-363 (misdemeanor cruelly transporting of animals), and 14-366 
(misdemeanor killing or injuring of livestock running at large). 
See text accompanying supra notes 82–97 for an explanation that the exemptions found in section 
14-360 must be implied into section 14-361, which also criminalizes acts of cruelty to animals, meaning 
the latter section must be treated under equal-protection analysis the same as section 14-360. 
 124. 93 S.E.2d 163 (N.C. 1956). 
 125. The unconstitutionality of the segregation proviso became apparent by the decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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administrative units, throughout the State, would be invalidated. Applicable legal 
principles impel the opposite conclusion. . . . The provisions [of the section], absent the 
mandatory requirement of enforced separation, are complete in themselves and 
capable of enforcement. Their separable and independent status is manifest. They 
antedate the [segregation] amendment. They survive the invalidation of the 
mandatory requirement of enforced separation . . . .126 
In striking only the unconstitutional clause in the section of the state 
constitution, the Constantian court relied on authorities concerning 
unconstitutional clauses in a statute, such as section 14-360: “A statute may be 
valid in part and invalid in part. If the parts are independent, or separable, but 
not otherwise, the invalid part may be rejected and the valid part may stand, 
provided it is complete in itself and capable of enforcement.”127 The 
misdemeanor and felony provisions of the animal-cruelty statute are similarly 
“complete” and can thus be enforced without the exemptions, particularly in 
light of the obligation of the prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the act of cruelty at issue was not justifiable. 
In the absence of an applicable severability clause, Constantian applied 
solution (b)—severing the unconstitutional provision from the otherwise viable 
statute. As will be shown below, seven of the nine exemptions in section 14-360 
may be subject to a severability clause, which strengthens the case for 
preserving the statute while excising the exemptions that deny equal protection 
of the law. This is illustrated by the statute at issue in Fulton Corp. v. 
Faulkner,128 which imposed an intangibles tax on corporate stock but totally 
exempted stock owned by a potential taxpayer that earned all of its taxable 
income in North Carolina, an exemption the United States Supreme Court had 
held unconstitutional.129 On remand, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
rejected the argument that invalidity of the exemption required invalidation of 
the entire statute imposing the intangibles tax on corporate stock. Before 
considering the severability clause applicable to the intangibles tax statute, the 
court stated this rule: “[I]f the separate parts of the statute are not so 
interrelated and mutually dependent that one part cannot be enforced without 
reference to another, the offending part must be severed and the rest of the 
statute enforced.”130 The court held there was no such interdependence between 
the exemption provision and the basic rule imposing the tax. The severability 
clause bolstered the decision to leave invalidated only the exemption provision. 
To sum up, the North Carolina Supreme Court will not sacrifice an 
important governmental program—such as funding local schools or raising 
revenue to run the state government by taxing investments—by invalidating an 
 
 126. Constantian, 93 S.E.2d at 167, 168. 
 127. Id. at 168 (citing Norfolk S. R. Co. v. Reid, 121 S.E. 534 (N.C. 1924)). 
 128. 481 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1997). 
 129. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996). This decision also invalidated partial exemptions 
from the property tax based on the percentage of income of the corporation subject to North Carolina’s 
income tax. 
 130. Faulkner, 481 S.E.2d at 9. The severability clause in Faulkner provided “for the severance of 
any part of the statute which is declared unconstitutional.” Id. at 10 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-215). 
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entire statutory scheme when the rest of the statute is not dependent on its 
invalid proviso and can be enforced with the latter stricken. As will be seen, 
seven of the nine exemptions in section 14-360 may be subject to a severability 
clause; but even in its absence, section 14-360 may not be held wholly 
unconstitutional because the exemptions deny equal protection of the law.131 
3. Extending the Exemptions to Cure the Unconstitutional Discrimination 
Is Impossible; Redrafting to Eliminate the Irrationality Is Not a Judicial 
Function with Respect to the Anti-Cruelty Statute 
As noted above, the third remedy sometimes available to a court to make 
constitutional a statute found to contain an unconstitutional exemption is 
rewriting the provision: either to extend the scope of the exemption so it is 
available to similarly situated actors presently unable to benefit from it or to 
shrink its scope so that it becomes rational despite the discrimination. The first 
approach to curing by rewriting—expanding the scope—is unavailable with 
respect to the exemptions in section 14-360 because of an inability to define the 
similarly situated actors who are unconstitutionally discriminated against by the 
existing nine exemptions. 
Putting aside for the moment the exemptions for hunters and trappers, the 
common thread among the eight other exemptions in section 14-360 seems to be 
that the protected actors interact frequently with animals while performing a 
service of some benefit to the public. The ideal plaintiff to attack these 
exemptions as discriminatory would be a person accused of animal cruelty who 
interacts often with animals and also performs a service of benefit to the public, 
but who is not protected by one of the other exemptions. Could a court or 
legislature draft and supplement the exemption provisions with a list of such 
actors—described by reference to what they do when interacting with animals—
that would protect all who could claim they are presently discriminated against 
by the section 14-360 exemptions? That would seem to be a very difficult task. 
A different approach would be to add a tenth exemption of the catch-all 
variety, such as for “any person who interacts frequently with animals while 
performing services that benefit the public” or “any activity that is similar to the 
activities described in subsection (c)(2) through (c)(4).”132 Exemptions worded 
in this manner, however, would make section 14-360 void for vagueness. Would 
the first formulation advise a farrier that shoeing horses is a service of public 
benefit? Is shoeing a horse similar to performing veterinary services? To 
producing livestock? 
The hunters’ exemption, in any event, cannot be put aside. It cannot be 
construed as available only to a person who hunts often; an eighty-year-old 
person going hunting for the first time in his life is entitled to it and under 
present law is permitted to torture an animal to death with intent to cause it 
 
 131. But see infra Part V and accompanying text. 
 132. These subsections lay out the eight existing exemptions other than that for hunters or trappers. 
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severe pain (although the hunter may have to do so immediately after 
wounding the animal). Could the hunters’ exemption possibly be extended 
judicially beyond the activity of hunters without use of language that is void for 
vagueness and without broadening it far beyond what the legislatures that 
created it could have intended? What of an exemption for “activities relating to 
recreation?” “Activities involving wild animals?” Surely they are 
unconstitutionally vague. The General Assembly could rewrite the exemption 
provision to delete the hunters’ exemption while retaining exemptions for 
actors who interact frequently with animals while performing a service of 
benefit to the public (assuming that would survive a void for vagueness attack). 
But could a court pick and choose which exemptions to strike and which to 
“cure,” given that the process of judicial cure rests on the notion that the court 
is doing what the legislature would want it to do? I would think it cannot. 
4. Irrationality and the Mens Rea for Felony Animal Cruelty 
Questions concerning possible cure of the unconstitutional denial of equal 
protection of the exemptions by extending them to more actors become 
irrelevant when the possibility of such a cure, as applied to the felony cruelty 
provision in section 14-360, is considered. There simply is no rational basis that 
can explain why the law would permit a hog farmer, scientist, veterinarian, 
hunter, or other actor currently covered by the exemptions to maliciously kill, 
torment, or maim an animal with bad motive—the elements of felony cruelty—
yet criminally punish another actor for the identical conduct whether or not the 
other actor interacted frequently with animals while performing useful services 
or was involved with wildlife. If malice and bad motive are excusable for the 
group now protected by section 14-360, upon what rationale can malice and bad 
motive possibly be criminal in the case of any other actors? It is difficult to 
think of one. 
An “exemption” for everyone would repeal the felony provision, totally 
frustrating legislative intent underlying its enactment.133 Thus the only 
alternative for the courts in seeking a remedy for the discriminatory effect of 
the exemptions when applied to felony cruelty is to strike all the exemptions in 
full. 
5. Irrationality and the Mens Rea for Misdemeanor Animal Cruelty 
The same argument can be made, of course, with respect to the 
misdemeanor animal-cruelty provision: that it is inherently irrational for the law 
to authorize anyone to commit unjustifiable cruelty to animals even though the 
person does not—as in the case of felony animal cruelty—act with malice or bad 
motive. If that argument is sound, consideration of redrafting the exemption to 
expand its scope as applied to misdemeanors becomes a moot point. The 
 
 133. See Note, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Exception Clause upon the Remainder of a Statute, 
55 Harv. L. Rev. 1030, 1035 (1942) (citing People v. Morgan, 246 P. 1024 (Colo. 1926)). 
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argument is not as convincing, however, in the misdemeanor context as when 
applied to an actor with bad motive or malice. 
The mens rea for misdemeanor cruelty is “intentionally.”134 The statute goes 
on to provide that “the word ‘intentionally’ refers to an act committed 
knowingly and without justifiable excuse.”135 If the defendant is accused of the 
misdemeanor described as “torment[ing]” an animal, lack of justification also 
becomes an element of the crime. Likewise, the definition of “torment” 
includes reference to “unjustifiable pain, suffering, or death.”136 These 
definitions make lack of justification an element of the misdemeanor. 
Justification is not an affirmative defense as to which the defendant in a 
criminal case carries the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.137 
Rather, “the State must prove that defendant . . . without justifiable excuse” 
committed the act of cruelty alleged by the prosecution.138 
Placing of the burden of proof on the prosecution to establish lack of 
justification will make one of the nine exemptions redundant in many cases: the 
exemption for “destruction of any animal for the purposes of protecting the 
public, other animals, property, or the public health.”139 Any defendant who 
could establish applicability of that exemption would usually negate the 
prosecution’s case of lack of justification. 
The prosecution’s burden to prove lack of justification also might render 
other exemptions likewise unnecessary in some fact settings. A district attorney 
would not charge a chicken farmer with cruelty for debeaking chickens, for 
example, since that procedure would be justifiable as a commonly used measure 
to prevent the birds from inflicting wounds on each other while in 
confinement.140 
 
 134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360(a). 
 135. Id. § 14-360(c). This codifies the case-law rule, developed under the statute when the statutory 
mens rea was “willfully,” that the prosecutor’s evidence had to show that the defendant acted (or failed 
to act) “without just cause, excuse, or justification.” State v. Fowler, 205 S.E.2d 749, 751 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1974). Accord State v. Dickens, 1 S.E.2d 837, 839 (N.C. 1939) (act of animal cruelty must be “without 
just cause, excuse or justification”). 
 136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360(c). 
 137. In North Carolina criminal law, the preponderance of the evidence instruction to the jury is 
given in terms of proof “to the satisfaction of the jury.” State v. Andrews, 572 S.E.2d 798, 801 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2002) (affirmative defense of automatism); Stave v. Davis, 485 S.E.2d 329, 330 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1997) (affirmative defense of entrapment). 
 138. State v. Dietrich, No. COA03-748, 2004 WL 1490064, at *2 (N.C. Ct. App. July 6, 2004) 
(unpublished decision tabled at 600 S.E.2d 521); see also State v. Neal, 27 S.E. 81, 85 (N.C. 1897) (in 
animal cruelty prosecution “[i]t was not incumbent on the defendant to prove justification” as a matter 
of criminal procedure rather than specific statutory mandate). That is the general rule in the United 
States. See, e.g., Rushin v. State, 267 S.E.2d 473 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980); Barnett v. State, 35 S.W.2d 441, 
443 (Tex. Crim. App. 1931). 
 139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360(c)(4). 
 140. The “biological . . . training” exemption is unnecessary in a case of bona fide use of animals by 
a qualified instructor in a classroom setting, because the pain caused to the animals will be justifiable. 
See N.J. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bd. of Educ., 219 A.2d 200 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
1966), aff’d per curiam, 227 A.2d 506 (N.J. 1967) (justifiable in high school science project to induce 
cancerous tumors in live chickens that will later be killed and dissected). 
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With respect to other commonly performed procedures affecting animals, 
the General Assembly in enacting exemptions could rationally be concerned 
that some triers of fact might find justification whereas others would not. 
Examples of this could include a veterinarian’s docking a dog’s tail or declawing 
a cat. A legislative pronouncement addressed to activities as to which triers of 
fact might disagree with respect to justification and that barred prosecution 
would be rational and not a denial of equal protection to actors whose acts of 
alleged cruelty are not of debatable justification. Such a clause in the cruelty 
statute would probably be more accurately described as a conclusive legislative 
declaration of justifiability rather than as an exemption. “Exemption” should 
refer only to an act or omission that is not justifiable, so that the would-be 
defendant would be free of culpability due to the proviso even though the 
prosecution could otherwise prove every element of the crime, including lack of 
justification. 
A legislative or judicial cure would have to carefully negotiate the straits 
between language so specific as to be discriminatory and language so broad as 
to be unconstitutionally vague.  It would be impossible for the legislature (or a 
court, for that matter) to cure the discrimination inherent in the present statute 
by creating a list that identifies additional actors (such as a farrier, dog groomer, 
movie director using animals, dog-show promoter, et cetera) whose acts or 
omission might fall into the category in which triers of fact could reach different 
conclusions on the issue of justifiability; yet any more general, “catch-all” 
phrase inserted to pick up overlooked actors likely would be void for vagueness. 
To avoid inadvertently depriving some group of the benefit of the statement of 
justifiability, broad language is required, such as “practices that are commonly 
accepted within an industry, profession, business, or sport.” But limiting the 
expanded declaration of justifiability by reference to four specific categories of 
actor risks a judicial finding of discriminatory exclusion of actors engaging in 
commonly accepted practices respecting animals in other areas of activities. 
Perhaps the equal protection problem in the misdemeanor provisions of section 
14-360 could be cured by extension if the nine exemptions were replaced by a 
broad statement such as, “Commonly accepted practices with respect to animals 
are justifiable.” This leaves it to the courts to answer the question, “Justifiable 
by whom?” Actors in an industry? The general public? If the proviso answered 
the “by whom” question, void for vagueness problems would be substantially 
reduced. 
Rewriting the nine existing exemptions to restrict them to activities of the 
specified actors that are commonly accepted practices probably would not cure 
the existing denial of equal protection. A horse trainer or pet motel operator, 
for example, would argue that he or she is as much entitled to be free from 
prosecution for engaging in commonly accepted practices within his or her 
profession as is a hog farmer or instructor in laboratory sciences. 
Nonetheless, according a special benefit to just nine categories of actors 
while denying it to others similarly situated might pass muster under some 
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decisions of the United States Supreme Court that apply what can be called the 
part-by-part or step-by-step theory of what is valid governmental regulation 
that treats similarly situated persons differently. These cases find no equal-
protection violation when a legislature has decided to regulate only part of a 
problem and leave similar issues for later consideration.141 These equal-
protection decisions do not require that there be a rational basis for deciding 
which part of a problem to regulate,142 which step of many possible steps to take 
legislatively. They essentially give carte blanche to lawmakers. 
However, there appears to be no United States Supreme Court decision 
upholding an exemption to a statute criminalizing specified activity under the 
step-by-step excuse for discriminatory legislation, and such an approach is 
certainly inconsistent with the equal-protection decisions by North Carolina 
courts dealing with such exemptions. The notion that partial regulation of a 
problem does not deny equal protection would have validated the criminal law 
held unconstitutional in North Carolina’s Glidden case, a law that applied the 
prohibition to corporations formed after March 4, 1915, but not those 
previously incorporated.143 The theory also would have required validating the 
ordinance in the Cheek case by which Charlotte took the “step” of banning 
certain massages by most actors but not barber shops and beauty shops.144 In 
State v. Greenwood, involving the ordinance that criminalized operating 
billiards halls on Sunday but not a bowling alley, the supreme court rejected the 
partial regulation theory. The court declared, 
The equal protection clauses [i.e., state and federal] do not require perfection in 
respect of classifications. In borderline cases, the legislative determination is entitled 
to great weight. However, this is not a borderline case. The Sunday closing ordinance 
here involved singles out and bans one particular business but permits other which 
provide facilities for recreation, sports and amusements, and potentially are equally 
disruptive.145 
These cases apply the rational-basis test to exemptions to criminal laws that the 
regulation-by-“steps” theory evades. It is irrational to assume there is a 
commonly accepted practice that constitutes cruelty to animals done by the nine 
categories of actors protected by section 14-360 as to which triers of fact might 
 
 141. See McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802, 819 (1969); Joseph E. Seagram & 
Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 50–51 (1966), overruled on other grounds; Healey v. Beer Inst., 491 
U.S. 324 (1989); Hughes v. Super. Ct. of Ca., 339 U.S. 460, 468–69 (1950). 
 142. Would the rational-basis test be satisfied by a supposition that members of the North Carolina 
General Assembly were aware of cruel practices impacting animals—considered justifiable by the 
legislators who believed that some triers of fact would disagree—that were done by veterinarians, hog 
farmers, hunters, and others benefiting from the nine exemptions, but were not aware of such practices 
by other actors frequently interacting with animals such as horse trainers and rodeo operators? 
 143. State v. Glidden, 46 S.E.2d 860 (N.C. 1948). See supra text accompanying note 111. 
 144. Cheek v. City of Charlotte, 160 S.E.2d 18 (N.C. 1968). 
 145. State v. Greenwood, 187 S.E.2d 8, 13 (N.C. 1972). Cf. State v. Tanner, 251 S.E.2d 705, 706 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (no denial of equal protection in a criminal law that prohibited possession of a 
firearm by felon who committed crime of violence but not nonviolent felony, not under step- or partial-
regulation theory but under test providing that “[t]he equal protection clauses do not require perfect 
classification” (citing Greenwood)). 
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disagree concerning justifiability, but no such commonly accepted practices 
performed by nonprotected actors such as dog trainers, pet sitters, and rodeo 
operators. Therefore, reforming the nine exemptions to be declarations of 
justifiability of commonly accepted practices cannot cure the denial of equal 
protection of the law currently caused by section 14-360. 
The legislature might be able to restrict the misdemeanor cruelty provision 
with a proviso—which could be invoked by any defendant—that commonly 
accepted practices are justifiable, but no court would ever “cure” the existing 
denial of equal protection in such a manner. Such a major rewriting of the 
statute is not an “extension” of any of the nine exemptions to cover everyone in 
the state. Any “extension” would have to allow additional actors to share the 
benefit of immunity from prosecution, even if the prosecution were able to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the act or omission of the defendant 
was not justifiable. The “commonly accepted” practices solution, rather than 
being an extension of exemptions, is a rewriting of the statute, something no 
court would do as a remedy for its holding that a portion of the statute is 
unconstitutionally underinclusive, for such rewriting is strictly a legislative 
function. As the United States Supreme Court declared as recently as 2006 with 
respect to its own power to cure a statute containing an unconstitutional 
proviso, “[M]indful that our constitutional mandate and institutional 
competence are limited, we restrain ourselves from ‘rewrit[ing] state law to 
conform it to constitutional requirements’ even as we strive to salvage it.”146 This 
limitation on judicial power is based on the conclusion that such a rewriting 
“entail[s] quintessentially legislative work.”147 
In sum, then, in the context of misdemeanor cruelty, no judicial cure of the 
unconstitutional denial of equal protection is possible by rewriting the scope of 
the exemptions. The exemptions must be stricken by the courts. 
V 
STANDING TO ASSERT THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EXEMPTIONS 
A. The Majority Rule: A Conviction Obtained Prior to Any Judicial Cure 
Must Be Reversed 
Even if a court could cure the unconstitutionality now infecting section 14-
360, any defendant convicted of animal cruelty before such a cure was devised 
would be entitled to reversal of the conviction and would thus have standing to 
challenge the consitutionality of the exemptions. 
 
 146. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 126 S. Ct. 961, 968 (2006) (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers 
Assn., Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)). 
 147. Ayotte, 126 S. Ct. at 968. See also Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) 
(stating that the court will not cure constitutional violation in part of act of Congress if “valid and 
invalid provisions [are] so intertwined that the Court would have to rewrite the law to allow it to 
stand”) (describing holding of Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 70–72 (1922)). 
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Because it is unlikely—almost inconceivable, given precedent—that the 
North Carolina Supreme Court would “cure” the denial of equal protection by 
rewriting the animal-cruelty exemptions, the cure would have to be, instead, 
excision of all the exemptions. If such a cure were ordered and a defendant 
convicted under pre-cure law, all but one of the pertinent decisions of the North 
Carolina Supreme Court would require reversal of the conviction. The rule 
emerging from these cases is that a conviction obtained under a criminal statute 
containing discriminatory exemptions cannot stand and a prosecution pending 
under such a statute must be quashed, even though the unconstitutionality can 
be cured. Thus in Glidden,148 in which a post-1915 corporation was prosecuted 
for polluting state waters under a statute exempting pre-1915 corporations from 
criminal responsibility, the exemption was held to be unconstitutionally 
discriminatory. The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment quashing the 
prosecution, even though it was clear the defendant understood that the statute 
sought to declare what it had done to be a crime. An earlier case, State v. 
Nash,149 seems to state a flat rule that a conviction under a criminal statute 
containing a discriminatory provision cannot stand, despite a judicial rewriting 
that eliminates the discrimination. In Nash, the state law criminalized the sale of 
“any spirituous liquor” in “dry” counties and cities but exempted sale of “wines 
from grapes, blackberries, currants, gooseberries, raspberries, and strawberries 
manufactured in this State” sold in sealed bottles and not to be consumed on 
the premises where the wine was sold.150 A Raleigh ordinance had adopted the 
“dry” option, and the defendant sold wine in Raleigh. The jury specially found 
that the defendant sold wine made from North Carolina grapes in a sealed 
bottle not to be consumed on the premises. The state appealed the judgment of 
acquittal on the ground that the exemption should have been ignored—in effect 
stricken from the statute—because the discrimination in favor of in-state 
produce violated the Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution. Holding the 
state could not appeal, the court declared it nevertheless would address the 
state’s argument: 
The discrimination may be inoperative when it affects injuriously the interests and 
rights of those who undertake to dispose of similar products of other States introduced 
into this, but it cannot lop off an essential exception or qualification of the penal 
statute, and leave the penal part of it in force. It must stand or fall in the form which 
the legislative will has assumed . . . .151 
A majority of U.S. jurisdictions agree that a conviction obtained under a 
statute that is unconstitutional because of an exemption that denies equal 
protection of the law cannot stand, even when the conduct of the defendant was 
 
 148. State v. Glidden, 46 S.E.2d 860 (N.C. 1948); see supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text. 
 149. 2 S.E. 645 (N.C. 1887). 
 150. Id. at 646. 
 151. Id. (emphasis added).  Nash is not factually on point because the conduct of the accused fell 
within the exemption and the state’s argument was that the defendant should have known the 
exemption was unconstitutional; moreover, because the court held the state could not appeal, this 
pronouncement is dicta. 
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clearly not within the exemption. A 1999 case decided by the Georgia Supreme 
Court considered the conviction of a defendant for driving a motor vehicle 
while having traces of marijuana in his blood. The statute under which he was 
convicted exempted drivers who had legally ingested marijuana.152 Holding that 
the exemption could not survive rational-basis scrutiny, the court reversed the 
conviction because the statute denied equal protection of the law.153 Since the 
defendant had made no claim to have legally used marijuana, minority rule 
states would have excised the exemption while affirming the conviction. Similar 
majority rule decisions are also found in cases from California,154 Florida,155 
Kentucky,156 Mississippi,157 Ohio,158 and Tennessee.159 
The majority rule has been aptly defended as essential to accord standing to 
individuals who alert the courts to an unconstitutional exemption in a criminal 
statute. A 1996 case from Oklahoma considered an obscenity statute that 
exempted from criminal prosecution a nonmanagerial employee of a movie 
theater that displayed an obscene movie, but not a nonmanagerial employee of 
a bookstore offering obscene magazines for sale.160 The majority of the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, affirming the conviction of the 
bookstore clerk, held the exemption rational because a bookstore employee 
could direct customers to obscenity, whereas the theater ticket-salesman could 
 
 152. Love v. State, 517 S.E.2d 53 (Ga. 1999).  Persons with traces of legally ingested marijuana in 
their blood would be liable only if the amount thereof were proved to have rendered them “incapable 
of driving safely.” GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-391(b) (2006). Under this subsection of the statute, the jury 
hung on the issue of whether the defendant was driving while impaired due to marijuana, but under the 
broader statute the jury convicted on the strict-liability crime. 
 153. Love, 517 S.E.2d at 57. 
 154. Ghafari v. Municipal Ct., 150 Cal. Rptr. 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (statute that criminalized 
wearing mask in public to conceal identity, with exemption for masks worn for amusement, denied 
equal protection; thus, prosecution of defendant who wore mask for political reasons was quashed); but 
see People v. Hofsheier, 129 P.3d 29, 42 (Cal. 2006) (favorably citing in dictum the minority rule case of 
People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984)). 
 155. Rollins v. State, 354 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1978) (statute criminalizing “play[ing] in any billiard 
parlor,” by a person under twenty-one with an exemption for “[p]ersons playing billiards in bona fide 
bowling establishments,” denied equal protection; the prosecution of the operator of billiard parlor was 
quashed). 
 156. Burrow v. Kapfhammer, 145 S.W.2d 1067 (Ky. 1940) (granting a restaurateur injunction against 
enforcement of overtime pay statute, violation of which was misdemeanor carrying thirty-day jail 
sentence (1940 Ky. Acts 421–22) because of exemption granted to hotels for employees doing cooking, 
waiting tables, and washing dishes). 
 157. Tatro v. State, 372 So. 2d 283 (Miss. 1979) (statute criminalizing fondling of child applicable 
only to “any male person,” thereby exempting female fondlers, denied equal protection, requiring 
reversal of male defendant’s conviction; dissent would have affirmed conviction upon curing statute by 
striking word “male”). 
 158. City of Cleveland v. Maistros, 762 N.E.2d 1065 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (statute criminalizing 
soliciting a person of the same gender for sex, thereby exempting heterosexual solicitation, denied 
equal protection, requiring reversal for the defendant who had made a homosexual solicitation). 
 159. State v. Whitehead, 43 S.W.3d 921 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (statute criminalizing  county 
commissioner’s receiving payments from party awarded county contracts not applicable in some 
counties denied equal protection, requiring reversal for defendant acting in county covered by statute). 
 160. Trim v. State, 909 P.2d 841 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996). 
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not.161 In dissent, Presiding Judge Johnson could find no rational basis for the 
discrimination. Addressing the appropriate remedy, he stated, 
Equal protection emphasizes a difference in treatment between classes of individuals 
whose situations are the same. . . . It is obvious to me that the members of the class 
within [the protection of the obscenity statute] will never be heard to complain 
because they are criminally exempt under the statute. Thus, only one outside the class, 
but similarly circumstanced, will ever be heard to cry “foul” at the different treatment. 
We have that very scenario before us at this time. . . . I would hold [the statute] 
unconstitutional as it denies equal protection to individuals whose situations are 
arguably indistinguishable. I would further reverse this case with instructions to 
dismiss.162 
B. The Minority Rule: The Conviction Stands 
The leading American case applying the minority rule is People v. Liberta,163 
decided by New York’s highest court in 1984. It addressed a defendant’s 
conviction under a rape statute that exempted rapes of men committed by 
women and rapes by men of their wives. Holding that the exemptions were 
unconstitutional as denying equal protection to rapists who did not qualify for 
their protection, the Court of Appeal cured these defects by excising both 
exemptions and then affirmed the defendant’s conviction for violating the 
reformed statute, stating, 
The defendant cannot claim that our decision to retain the rape and sodomy statutes, 
and thereby affirm his conviction, denies him due process of the law. The due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that an accused have had fair warning 
at the time of his conduct that such conduct was made criminal by the State (see Bouie 
v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347). Defendant did not come within any of the 
exemptions which we have stricken, and thus his conduct was covered by the statutes 
as they existed at the time of his attack . . . . 
Neither can it be said that by the affirmance of his conviction the defendant is 
deprived of a constitutionally protected right to equal protection. The remedy chosen 
by our opinion is to extend the coverage of the provisions for forcible rape and 
sodomy to all those to whom these provisions can constitutionally be applied. While 
this remedy does treat the defendant differently than, for example, a married man 
who, while living with his wife, raped her prior to this decision, the distinction is 
rational inasmuch as it is justified by the limitations imposed on our remedy by the 
notice requirements of the due process clause (US Const, [amend. XIV]), and the 
prohibition against ex post facto laws (US Const, art I, § 10). Thus, for purposes of 
choosing the proper remedy, the defendant is simply not similarly situated to those 
persons who were not within the scope of the statutes as they existed prior to our 
decision.164 
 
 161. Id. at 844. 
 162. Id. at 845. 
 163. 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985). 
 164. Id. at 579. 
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Based on this reasoning, the minority rule has been applied to preserve criminal 
convictions under unconstitutional statutes in Alabama,165 Alaska,166 Illinois,167 
and South Carolina,168 as well as New York. 
The logic of Liberta is flawed. Asserting that a statute with an 
unconstitutional exemption gives notice to a nonexempted potential defendant 
that an act he may commit is a crime ignores the fact that the potential 
defendant cannot know whether a court addressing the unconstitutional 
exemption will cure the denial of equal protection by excising the exemption or 
by voiding the entire statute.169 That the potential defendant cannot know what 
the statute will criminalize until a court has addressed it is true, even if the 
statute is subject to a severability clause, for such a clause is not binding on 
courts.170 At the most, it raises a presumption that the proper remedy is to strike 
the unconstitutional exception rather than to void the entire statute.171 
 
 165. Williams v. State, 494 So. 2d 819 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (excising spousal exemption from 
forcible sodomy statute, quoting liberally from Liberta); Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 1986) (same treatment of rape statute). 
 166. Plas v. State, 598 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1979) (striking “by a female” from a prostitution statute to 
cure denial of equal protection extending its scope to male prostitutes, and affirming conviction of 
female defendant for violation, with no discussion of due process and equal protection problems 
addressed in Liberta). 
 167. People v. M.D., 595 N.E.2d 702 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (striking spousal exemption from one 
portion of rape statute to cure denial of equal protection, while affirming conviction under another 
provision when victim was defendant’s wife). 
 168. State v. Watkins, 191 S.E.2d 135 (S.C. 1972), vacated, 413 U.S. 905 (1973) (affirming obscenity 
conviction after excising from statute unconstitutional exemption for films with Motion Picture 
Association of America seal of approval). 
The minority rule has also been applied to strike an unconstitutional exemption from a criminal 
sentencing provision. See State v. Tester, 879 S.W.2d 823 (Tenn. 1994) (voiding as denial of equal 
protection provision that defendant convicted of second drunk-driving conviction in three of state’s 
counties was subjected to mandatory forty-five-day term of work release, whereas in other counties 
sentence was forty-five days in jail); Ex parte Tullos, 541 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) 
(sentencing statute providing jail term for seventeen-year-old male drunk drivers but not seventeen-
year-old females denied equal protection, but males could be subjected to confinement after judicial 
cure by striking female exemption). But an exemption affecting only the applicable sentence is 
distinguishable from an exemption that negates criminal responsibility, which affects whether a 
potential defendant is given notice of what conduct is criminal. See Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 
(1948); McDonald v. Mass., 180 U.S. 311, 313 (1901). 
 169. See Note, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Exception Clause, supra note 133: “By far the most 
common fate of statutes containing unconstitutional exceptions is complete destruction. And generally 
the broader the exception the more likely are courts to void the entire statute.” Id. at 1030. “[C]ourts 
have usually refused to extend the scope of a criminal statute” by excising the exemption. Id. at 1031. 
For the quite different argument that at least federal courts are compelled to apply the majority rule 
by the grant to them of judicial power in Article III of the U.S. Constitution, see Bruce K. Miller, 
Constitutional Remedies for Underinclusive Statutes: A Critical Appraisal of Heckler v. Mathews, 20 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 105, 115–16 (1985). 
 170. See Sheffield v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 276 S.E.2d 422 (N.C. 1981); State ex rel. Andrews v. 
Chateau X, Inc., 250 S.E.2d 603 (N.C. 1979), vacated on another ground, 445 U.S. 947 (1980). 2 SINGER, 
supra note 71, § 44.8 at 585–86; John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203 (1993). 
 171. See Heckler v. Mathews 456 U.S. 728 (1984); Note, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Exception 
Clause, supra note 133, at 1036 (severability clause “merely serves to indicate a presumption of 
severability”). In North Carolina the presumption appears to be fairly strong. See Fulton Corp. v. 
Faulkner, 481 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1997). 
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Certainly, too, one can disagree with Liberta’s assertion that under equal-
protection analysis one who rapes his fiancée or live-in lover is not “similarly 
situated” to one who rapes his wife. Each such rapist has violated without 
consent the body of a woman who has placed faith and trust in him.172 Courts 
applying the majority rule can ascertain no rational basis for different treatment 
under the criminal law of such actors. It thus becomes necessary to reverse the 
conviction of the defendant who rapes his fiancée or lover prior to invalidation 
of the spousal exemption because persons who raped their spouses on the same 
day the convicted defendant acted cannot be prosecuted. 
In cases involving noncriminal statutes, the United States Supreme Court 
has applied to litigants to their disadvantage a statute the Court reformed to 
cure an unconstitutional exemption.173 It has not, however, saved a criminal 
conviction by applying the minority rule.174 The distinction rests on the due-
process rule that in the criminal context the statutory language must clearly 
advise a potential defendant what conduct will be punished by imprisonment. 
Justice Harlan considered the issue of appropriate remedy to be presented in 
the 1970 Welsh case,175 in which the defendant had been convicted of refusing to 
submit to induction into the armed services under a statutory scheme that 
exempted religious-founded conscientious objectors. Unlike the majority, 
Harlan was unable to construe the exemption to extend to objectors adhering to 
nontheistic religions, which, in his view, made the exemption unconstitutional. 
Although recognizing that the Court had in civil cases cured a denial of equal 
protection arising out of a discriminatory exemption by striking the 
exemption,176 since Welsh had been convicted under an unconstitutional 
criminal statute, Harlan declared, “[I]t is clear to me that this conviction must 
be reversed . . . . ”177 
 
 172. Justice Ginsburg quite clearly disagrees with the notion of Liberta that punishing the current 
defendant, but not a prior accused because of the bar of ex post facto application of the reformed 
statute, does not deny equal protection: “Nor is prospective extension of a tax, penalty or other burden 
an altogether satisfactory response, for that would leave the challenger unrelieved with respect to past 
unequal treatment.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Repair 
Unconstitutional Legislation, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301, 319 (1979). She then applies this reasoning to 
the criminal case of Tatro v. State, 372 So. 2d 283 (Miss. 1979), criticizing the dissenting opinion for 
proposing to affirm a conviction of a male defendant for fondling a child under a statute applicable only 
to a “male person” by excising the word “male,” thereby eliminating the exemption for female fondlers. 
The dissent, according to Justice Ginsburg, overlooked that “persons similarly situated”—females—
were not subject to prosecution at the time the defendant acted. Id. at 319–20 n.114. 
 173. See, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984), strongly criticized in Miller, supra note 169; 
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
 174. Cf. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 335 (1921) (“not clear” if defendant convicted despite 
exemption invalid under equal protection analysis entitled to reversal of conviction of statute 
criminalizing picking business) (dictum). 
 175. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
 176. 398 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 177. Id. at 362. Justice Ginsburg seems to agree with Justice Harlan’s view that reversal was 
necessary after he interpreted the exemption in a way that made it unconstitutional. See Ginsburg, 
supra note 172, at 308–10. 
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C. Lack of Clarity in North Carolina after McCleary 
In McCleary, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, it has been shown, 
excised the unconstitutional exemption in an anti-lottery statute in favor of 
homeowners’ organizations, and then affirmed the defendant’s conviction. This 
was done without citing any case, including the North Carolina Supreme 
Court’s decision in Glidden, which had reversed a defendant’s conviction upon 
holding an exemption favoring pre-1915 corporations in a criminal pollution 
statute to be unconstitutional. Glidden surely required reversal in McCleary, 
unless McCleary was distinguishable because the statute at issue there was 
subject to a severability clause, while that in Glidden was not. 
After the North Carolina Supreme Court granted review in McCleary,178 
both sides filed new briefs that focused the court’s attention away from the issue 
whether the court of appeals could affirm the lottery operator’s conviction after 
the exemptions from the anti-gambling statute had been excised. The defense 
brief presented four distinct bases for reversal, which were unrelated to the 
question whether a conviction could be affirmed in such circumstances. On the 
last page of the brief, defense counsel devoted only eight garbled lines to the 
latter point and cited not a single authority, even though, as shown above, 
several North Carolina Supreme Court decisions had reversed a conviction in 
such a situation.179 
On the other hand, the state made no attempt to defend the asserted power 
exercised by the court of appeals to affirm a conviction under a criminal statute 
after curing the constitutional defect by striking its unconstitutional exemptions. 
Instead, the prosecution argued that the court of appeals was wrong in 
invalidating the exemptions for raffles and bingo games conducted by 
homeowners’ or property owners’ associations, on the ground that the proper 
construction of the statute was that the proceeds of such endeavors had to be 
spent on land or buildings that the public could use.180 
The six-line per curiam opinion of the North Carolina Supreme Court in 
McCleary does not address in any way whether the conviction could be affirmed 
after excision of the unconstitutional portion of the statute. Instead it considers 
only whether the statute was constitutional after that act of reformation. The 
opinion stated that the “thoughtful, well-reasoned, and thoroughly documented 
majority opinion” of the court of appeals “justif[ied] its decision sustaining the 
 
 178. 308 S.E.2d 883, 897 (N.C. App. 1983). 
 179. Def.-Appellant’s New Br., State v. McCleary, No. 13A84, Supreme Court of North Carolina, at 
9 (filed Mar. 13, 1984). The eight lines of “argument” are as follows: 
Defendant McCleary contends that the North Carolina legislative [sic] had a particular 
scheme or plan as to what classes of organizations it intended to exempt. If it appears that 
certain classes selected by the legislative [sic] as exempt constitute unconstitutional class 
legislation in deriving the classes was [sic] likewise unconstitutional. Defendant further 
contends that for the Court to find two classes to be unconstitutional . . . is in effect taking 
over the legislative process and developing it [sic] own plan or scheme as to what 
organizations should be exempt. 
 180. Id. at 11–12. 
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constitutionality of the questioned statutes.”181 Whether this brief per curiam 
opinion by the North Carolina Supreme Court is a decision on the merits that it 
was proper to affirm the conviction after reforming the statute to make it 
constitutional can be debated, because that court has explained that the reason 
why its per curiam decisions have the same force as precedent as “regular” 
opinions is that the former contain citations to authorities.182 The McCleary per 
curiam cited only to the very statute whose constitutionality had been cured by 
the lower court. 
Assuming, however, that the McCleary per curiam is precedent that in some 
cases a conviction obtained under an unconstitutional statute can be affirmed 
by an appellate court that cures the unconstitutionality, the decision cannot be 
read as overruling Glidden and the general rule employed by the North 
Carolina Supreme Court that reversal of a conviction is often required in such a 
circumstance. A supreme court precedent such as Glidden will not be held to 
have been overruled by implication unless the inference of intent to do so is 
“compelling.”183 At most, the McCleary per curiam can be viewed as holding 
that Glidden is distinguishable when, as in McCleary, the unconstitutional 
criminal statute is subject to a severability clause, creating the opportunity in 
some cases of severability clauses to affirm the conviction obtained under an 
unconstitutional statute—that is, to apply the minority rule. 
D. Severability Clauses as a License to Cure? 
The short McCleary per curiam certainly does not establish that North 
Carolina courts should employ the minority rule in every situation in which a 
curable unconstitutional criminal statute is subject to a severability clause. In 
fact, the severability clause in the 1998 session law that created six of the nine 
exemptions found in section 14-360 and re-enacted the hunters’ exemption is 
readily distinguishable from that before the courts in McCleary. 
The clause in McCleary appeared in a relatively short enactment and was 
addressed narrowly to “any provision” of the law and to “any application there 
to any person or circumstance.”184 By the latter language, even a subsection of 
one of the affected gambling statutes could be invalid in part but valid as 
applied in different circumstances. The severability clause arguably applicable 
to seven of the nine exemptions in section 14-360 applies to “any section or 
provision” of the lengthy bill to which it was attached185 but does not address the 
possibility that a “provision” could be constitutional in one application but not 
in another.  Further, the severability clause in McCleary was part of a short 
 
 181. State v. McCleary, 316 S.E.2d 870 (N.C. 1984). 
 182. See Bigham v. Foor, 158 S.E. 548, 549 (N.C. 1931) (“Per curiam decisions stand upon the same 
footing as those in which fuller citations of authorities are made and more extended opinions are 
written.”) (emphasis added); Hyder v. Bd. of Rd. Trustees, 130 S.E. 497, 497 (N.C. 1925) (explaining 
that a per curiam opinion “supported by full citation of authorities” has “force as a precedent”). 
 183. Riley v. Debaer, 547 S.E.2d 831, 833 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). 
 184. See supra note 118. 
 185. See supra note 120. 
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session law dealing solely with criminal laws concerning gambling.186 After 
section 1 of this law amended a statute dealing broadly with gambling, all other 
sections of the law concerned the narrow area of gambling in the form of bingo 
and raffles.187 
The severability clause arguably applicable to seven of the section 14-360 
exemptions,188 on the other hand, appears to be what a scholar writing in the 
North Carolina Law Review calls a “general severability clause” in 
contradiction to one that is “specific.”189 The severability clause at issue in 
considering the effect of the per curiam affirmance in McCleary—whether a 
person convicted of violating a criminal statute is entitled to a reversal of his or 
her conviction because of the unconstitutionality of its exemptions—does not 
apply to every statute in effect in North Carolina. But it is applicable to 
hundreds of them. This severability clause was appended to the state’s budget 
bill for 1999, a law that not only included matters relating to finance but which 
also enacted or amended scores of statutes on myriad topics tacked onto the 
budget bill. The revision of section 14-360 was among those “tack-on” 
provisions. The severability clause at issue is found at the end of a session law 
that was 399 pages long and comprised of thirty-five parts, each containing 
numerous sections and often subsections as well. Provisions dealing with the 
budget—mainly appropriations measures—comprise about ninety percent of 
the 399 pages. Other types of legislation in the session law concerned reporting 
requirements and regulatory and administrative changes. Only six and one half 
of the 399 pages in the bill made changes with respect to criminal law.190  
Courts are quick to deny the broadest possible effect to general severability 
clauses. In a case from Indiana,191 the state supreme court considered the effect 
of what it called a “general severability clause” that literally applied to all 
sections of the Indiana Code of 1976. The court declared that because the 
severability clause applied to so many provisions, the notion was “ludicrous” 
that the Indiana legislature had intended to preclude courts from holding that 
the relationship between two related statutes was such that the 
unconstitutionality of one could not lead to a holding that the other statute also 
had to fall.192 The high court of Maryland held that a severability proviso 
 
 186. N.C. LAWS ch. 893 (1979).  Section 8 is the severability clause, quoted in supra note 120. The 
statute occupies just over three pages in the volume of 1979 laws. It substantively altered only four 
sections of the General Statutes and made conforming technical language changes in four more. 
 187. Id. §§ 2–7, 10–11. 
 188. Section 30.5 of the budget act, N.C. LAWS ch. 212 (1998),  provides, “If any section or provision 
of this act is declared unconstitutional or invalid by the courts, it does not affect the validity of this act 
as a whole or any part other than the part so declared to be unconstitutional.” 
 189. Nagle, supra note 170, at 243 (“Severability clauses include both specific provisions in a 
particular statute detailing which provisions of that statute are severable and general severability 
clauses stating that all statutes are severable.”). 
 190. See N.C. LAWS ch. 212,  §§ 17.16, 17.19 (1998). 
 191. Ind. Educ. Employment Relations Bd. v. Benton Cmty. Sch. Corp., 365 N.E.2d 752, 762 (Ind. 
1977). 
 192. Id. 
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applicable by its terms to all statutes enacted in Maryland after July 1, 1973, that 
did not contain a nonseverability clause, was “merely declaratory of an 
established rule of construction” found in the case law.193 
The point is this: A potential defendant who is not protected by any 
exemption who considers future actions that might constitute cruelty to animals 
but who believes the exemptions to section 14-360 are plainly unconstitutional 
will wonder whether Glidden would apply to him, quashing his prosecution, or 
whether McCleary would apply, permitting his conviction. Since McCleary is an 
exception to general applicability in North Carolina of the majority rule 
requiring acquittal if charges are brought, and because the severability clause in 
McCleary was much narrower than that applicable to section 14-360, the 
potential defendant is not put on notice as to what will happen to him. Due 
process considerations require that judicial expansion of the McCleary remedy 
to criminal statutes covered by a general severability clause, not written in 
terms of specific applications, be prospective only in application. They require 
that a defendant obtain reversal of his conviction for animal cruelty in the 
litigation in which an appellate court does expand McCleary in such manner. 
In any event, McCleary can apply only to the seven of section 14-360’s nine 
exemption provisions first enacted. The last two—for producers of aquatic 
species and producers of food for humans and animals194—were added to section 
14-360 in 1999 by a session law that did not contain a severability clause.195 
Whether this means the severability clause attached to the 1998 law that added 
seven exemptions was nullified is uncertain.196 It also need not be decided, 
because at present, a nonexempt defendant who is convicted of animal cruelty 
in violation of section 14-360 can seek reversal of his or her conviction under 
Glidden and the majority rule. The defendant can evade application of 
McCleary by arguing only that he or she is denied equal protection by the 
 
 193. Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 353 A.2d 222, 234 (Md. 1976). 
 194. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360(c)(2), (2a), quoted supra note 1. 
 195. N.C. LAWS ch. 209 (1999), containing ten sections dealing primarily with the regulation of 
fisheries and shellfish. 
 196. Nolichuckey Sand Co., Inc. v. Huddleston, 896 S.W.2d 782, 790–91 (Tenn. App. 1994), involved 
constitutional problems with a property-tax statute enacted in 1985 without a severability clause. It 
replaced a similar 1984 tax statute that had such a clause. Referring to the 1985 law as a new act, not an 
amendment, the court held it should not rely on the severability clause in the 1984 act in deciding 
whether to invalidate all of the 1985 law but instead on common-law principles of severability. This case 
is distinguishable because the inclusion of the already-enacted seven exemptions in the text of the 1999 
revision of section 14-360 seems more properly classified as a re-enactment for the purpose of 
amending rather than creating a new act. On the other hand, the re-enactment of an anti-pornography 
statute that dropped a severability clause contained in its predecessor was described by the court in 
State v. Honore, 564 So. 2d 345, 350 (La. Ct. App. 1990), as a re-enactment without substantial changes. 
Nevertheless, the court severed the unconstitutional part of the new law, not based on the severability 
clause in the prior statute, but based on case-law approaches to severability in Louisiana. Honore is 
factually quite similar to the problem raised by the 1999 “re-enactment” of section 14-360. 
People v. District Court, 834 P.2d 181, 189–90 n.10 (Colo. 1992), involved constitutional problems 
with 1988 changes to some of the sections of the state’s death penalty statute. The 1984 legislature had 
added a severability provision to the law in the form of a codified section. Because it was codified, it 
was held applicable to the 1988 amendments. The problem raised by the North Carolina animal-cruelty 
statute is distinguishable because the 1998 severability clause was not codified. 
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existence of the aquatic species and food production exemptions, which are not 
subject to a severability clause. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
The nine exemptions that have been appended over the years to North 
Carolina’s criminal animal-cruelty statute, section 14-360, deprive nonprotected 
actors of equal protection of the law.  Cure by extension of the exemptions is 
impossible. Rather, upon holding the exemptions unconstitutional, a court 
would cure the constitutional defect by excising them from the statute. 
Under the remedial law employed in North Carolina, any defendant 
prosecuted for violating section 14-360 has standing to assert the statute’s 
invalidity due to its discriminatory exemption. If Glidden controls, North 
Carolina courts will reverse that defendant’s conviction even while curing the 
constitutional defect. 
This article has focused on exemptions in the North Carolina criminal 
animal-cruelty statute, but similar equal-protection issues are raised by 
exemptions in a majority of other states’ animal-cruelty statutes. All such 
statutes containing exemptions that are absolute or qualified—as well as those 
containing what are termed herein as legislative declarations of justifiability of 
an act causing pain or death to an animal—are collected in the appendix that 
follows. 
Georgia Code section 16-12-4(e) surely raises constitutional problems of 
equal protection as serious as those that North Carolina’s exemptions present. 
One can count eighteen exempt categories in the Georgia statute, and they 
apply to both misdemeanor and felony cruelty, the latter constituting malicious 
maiming or killing of an animal.197 
Kentucky provides at least eleven exemptions applicable to misdemeanor 
cruelty198 and to felony torture of a dog or cat.199 Montana’s statute offers at least 
eight, applicable to misdemeanor cruelty and to felony cruelty, arising out of a 
 
 197. GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-12-4(c) (2006). Since the legislative intent in Georgia is, as with North 
Carolina, clearly to provide an exemption to prosecutions for felony cruelty, the limiting clause in the 
Georgia exemption proviso purporting to restrict the exemptions to “conduct which is otherwise 
permitted under the laws of this state or of the United States,” GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-4(e)—
reminiscent of the “lawful activities” language in North Carolina’s section 14-360—almost certainly 
cannot be construed literally. No Georgia or federal law permits killing or maiming an animal 
“maliciously.” Thus, a literal interpretation of the Georgia restriction would disregard the words that 
introduce the exemptions—“[t]he provisions of this Code section shall not be construed as 
prohibiting”—and reform it to exclude subsection (c) of the section, the felony provision. The predicted 
interpretation is that the “conduct otherwise permitted” language refers to lawful conduct in 
connection with which the unlawful felonious cruelty was committed. 
 198. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.130(2) (2006). I exclude subdivisions (c) and (i) thereof as 
describing actions that are justifiable. 
 199. Id. § 525.135(4). 
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second conviction for violating the statute.200 Maybe the courts of Kentucky, 
Montana, and other states can find a way to give a narrow construction to what 
appear to absolute exemptions applied to misdemeanor cruelty, saving them 
from an equal-protection attack under the step-by-step theory of regulation. 
And maybe not. 
At the very least, an increased amount of litigation concerning the 
constitutionality of exemptions in criminal animal cruelty statutes can be 
predicted. 
 
 200. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-211(4) (2005). The felony provision is subsection (2)(a) of the 
statute. 
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APPENDIX201 
This Appendix reproduces the text of nonliability provisions found in 
criminal animal-cruelty statutes in American states (other than North Carolina) 
and the District of Columbia. Exemptions that appear to be basically absolute 
are in bold face. Exemptions that are qualified are in italics. Provisions in 
regular Roman typeface are considered to be not exemptions at all but 
statements by the legislature of conduct respecting animals that is justified and 




This article shall not apply to any of the following persons or institutions: 
(1) Academic and research enterprises that use dogs or cats for medical or 
pharmaceutical research or testing. 
(2) Any owner of a dog or cat who euthanizes the dog or cat for humane 
purposes. 
(3) Any person who kills a dog or cat found outside of the owned or rented 
property of the owner or custodian of the dog or cat when the dog or cat threatens 
immediate physical injury or is causing physical injury to any person, animal, 
bird, or silvicultural or agricultural industry. 
(4) A person who shoots a dog or cat with a BB gun not capable of inflicting 
serious injury when the dog or cat is defecating or urinating on the person’s 
property. 
(5) A person who uses a training device, anti-bark collar, or an invisible 




(c) It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that the conduct of the 
defendant 
(1) was part of scientific research governed by accepted standards; 
(2) constituted the humane destruction of an animal; 
(3) conformed to accepted veterinary or animal husbandry practices; 
(4) was necessarily incidental to lawful fishing, hunting or trapping activities; 
(5) conformed to professionally accepted training and discipline standards. 
(e) This section does not apply to generally accepted dog mushing or pulling 
contests or practices or rodeos or stock contests. 
 
 
 201. Amy Kalman, Duke Law School class of 2006, is largely responsible for the preparation of this 
Appendix. 
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ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES 
§ 13-2910.06. DEFENSE TO CRUELTY TO ANIMALS AND BIRD FIGHTING 
It is a defense to sections 13-2910, 13-2910.01, 13-2910.02, 13-2910.03 and 13-
2910.04 that the activity charged involves the possession, training, exhibition or 
use of a bird or animal in the otherwise lawful sports of falconry, animal 
hunting, rodeos, ranching or the training or use of hunting dogs.202 
§ 13-2910.05. EXEMPT ACTIVITIES 
Activity involving the possession, training, exhibition or use of an animal in 
the otherwise lawful pursuits of hunting, ranching, farming, rodeos, shows and 
security services shall be exempt from the provisions of sections 13-2910.01, 13-
2910.02, 13-2910.03 and 13-2910.04.* 
 
ARKANSAS CODE 
§ 5-62-110. DEFINITIONS 
(b) Nothing in this section . . . shall be construed as prohibiting the shooting 
of a bird or other game for the purpose of human food. 
 
COLORADO REVISED STATUTES 
§ 18-9-201.5. SCOPE OF PART 2. 
(1) Nothing in this part 2 shall affect accepted animal husbandry practices 
utilized by any person in the care of companion or livestock animals or in the 
extermination of undesirable pests as defined in articles 7, 10, and 43 of title 35, 
C.R.S. 
§ 18-9-202. CRUELTY TO ANIMALS - AGGRAVATED CRUELTY TO ANIMALS - 
NEGLECT OF ANIMALS - OFFENSES - REPEAL. 
(VII) This paragraph (a.5) does not apply to the treatment of pack or draft 
animals by negligently overdriving, overloading, or overworking them, or the 
treatment of livestock and other animals used in the farm or ranch production of 
food, fiber, or other agricultural products when such treatment is in accordance 
with accepted agricultural animal husbandry practices, the treatment of animals 
involved in activities regulated pursuant to article 60 of title 12, C.R.S. 
[dealing with horse racing], the treatment of animals involved in research if such 
research facility is operating under rules set forth by the state or federal 
government, the treatment of animals involved in rodeos, the treatment of dogs 
used for legal hunting activities, wildlife nuisances, or to statutes regulating 
activities concerning wildlife and predator control in the state, including 
trapping. 
§ 18-9-204. ANIMAL FIGHTING - PENALTY. 
 
 202. This provision is classified as an absolute exemption on the ground that the activity exempted is 
not in violation of any law other than the animal-cruelty law. Hereinafter, an asterisk added to a statute 
in this Appendix signifies that the provision is classified as an absolute exemption on the same theory as 
to the significance of the requirement that the activity be “lawful” or in accordance with specified laws. 
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(3) Nothing in this section shall prohibit normal hunting practices as 
approved by the division of wildlife. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the training of 
animals or the use of equipment in the training of animals for any purpose not 




(b) . . . The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any licensed 
veterinarian while following accepted standards of practice of the profession or to 
any person while following approved methods of slaughter under section 22-
272a, while performing medical research as an employee of, student in or 
person associated with any hospital, educational institution or laboratory, while 
following generally accepted agricultural practices or while lawfully engaged in 
the taking of wildlife. 
 
DELAWARE STATUTES 
TIT. 7, § 1709 INJURING OR KILLING DOGS FOR CERTAIN ACTS 
(a) Any police officer, constable or dog warden who finds a dog running at 
large and deems such dog to be an immediate threat to the public health and 
welfare may kill such dog. 
(b) Any person may injure or kill a dog in self-defense or to protect 
livestock, poultry or another human being at the time such dog is attacking such 
livestock, poultry or human being. 
(c) Any person may injure or kill a dog at the time such dog is wounding 
another dog if the dog being wounded is on the property of its owner or under 
the immediate control of its owner and being wounded by a dog that is running 
at large. 
TIT. 11, § 1325 
(b) A person is guilty of cruelty to animals when the person intentionally or 
recklessly: 
(3) Kills or injures any animal belonging to another person without legal 
privilege or consent of the owner; or 
(4) Cruelly or unnecessarily kills or injures any animal whether belonging to 
the actor or another. This section does not apply to the killing of any animal 
normally or commonly raised as food for human consumption, provided that 
such killing is not cruel. A person acts unnecessarily if the act is not required to 
terminate an animal’s suffering, to protect the life or property of the actor or 
another person or if other means of disposing of an animal exist which would 
not impair the health or well-being of that animal 
(5) Paragraphs (1), (2) and (4) of this subsection are inapplicable to accepted 
veterinary practices and activities carried on for scientific research. 
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(f) This section shall not apply to the lawful hunting or trapping of animals 
as provided by law.* 
 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA STATUTES 
§ 22-1012 
(b) Nothing contained in §§ 22-1001 to 22-1009, inclusive, and §§ 22- 1011 
and 22-1309 shall be construed to prohibit or interfere with any properly 
conducted scientific experiments or investigations, which experiments shall be 
performed only under the authority of the faculty of some regularly incorporated 
medical college, university, or scientific society. 
 
FLORIDA STATUTES 
§ 828.02 DEFINITIONS 
In this chapter, and in every law of the state relating to or in any way 
affecting animals, the word “animal” shall be held to include every living dumb 
creature; the words “torture,” “torment,” and “cruelty” shall be held to include 
every act, omission, or neglect whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable pain or 
suffering is caused, except when done in the interest of medical science, 
permitted, or allowed to continue when there is reasonable remedy or relief; 
and the words “owner” and “person” shall be held to include corporations, and 
the knowledge and acts of agents and employees of corporations in regard to 
animals transported, owned, employed by or in the custody of a corporation, 
shall be held to be the knowledge and act of such corporation. 
§ 828.12 
(3) A veterinarian licensed to practice in the state shall be held harmless 
from either criminal or civil liability for any decisions made or services rendered 
under the provisions of this section. Such a veterinarian is, therefore, under this 
subsection, immune from a lawsuit for his or her part in an investigation of 
cruelty to animals. 
§ 828.122 FIGHTING OR BAITING ANIMALS, OFFENSE, PENALTIES 
(9) This section shall not apply to: 
(a) Any person simulating a fight for the purpose of using the simulated 
fight as part of a motion picture which will be used on television or in a motion 
picture, provided s. 828.12 is not violated. 
(b) Any person using animals to pursue or take wildlife or to participate in 
any hunting regulated or subject to being regulated by the rules and regulations 
of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission. 
(c) Any person using animals to work livestock for agricultural purposes. 
(e) Any person using dogs to hunt wild hogs or to retrieve domestic hogs 
pursuant to customary hunting or agricultural practices. 
(10) This section shall not prohibit, impede, or otherwise interfere with 
recognized animal husbandry and training techniques or practices not otherwise 
specifically prohibited by law. 
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§ 828.125 KILLING OR AGGRAVATED ABUSE OF REGISTERED BREED 
HORSES OR CATTLE; OFFENSES; PENALTIES 
(5) This section shall not be construed to abridge, impede, prohibit, or 
otherwise interfere in any way with the application, implementation, or conduct 
of recognized livestock husbandry practices or techniques by or at the direction 
of the owner of the livestock so husbanded; nor shall any person be held culpable 
for any act prohibited by this chapter which results from weather conditions or 
other acts of God, providing that the person is in compliance with recognized 
livestock husbandry practices. 
§ 828.14. WATER AND FOOD FOR STOCK ON TRAINS, VESSELS, ETC. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall apply to owners, officers, or crew of water 
craft detained on the navigable waters of this state by storms and prevented by 
bad weather from reaching port. 
 
GEORGIA CODE 
§ 4-8-5 PERFORMING CRUEL ACTS ON, OR HARMING, MAIMING OR KILLING 
DOGS 
(c) This Code section shall not be construed to limit in any way the authority 
or duty of any law enforcement officer, dog or rabies control officer, humane 
society, or veterinarian. 
§ 4-11-13. ARTICLE NOT APPLICABLE TO PERSONS RAISING ANIMALS FOR 
HUMAN CONSUMPTION 
The provisions of this article shall not apply to any person who raises, keeps, 
or maintains animals solely for the purposes of human consumption. 
§ 16-12-4. CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
(a) As used in this Code section, the term: 
(1) “Animal” shall not include any fish nor shall such term include any pest 
that might be exterminated or removed from a business, residence, or other 
structure. 
(e) The provisions of this Code section shall not be construed as prohibiting 
conduct which is otherwise permitted under the laws of this state or of the 
United States,* including, but not limited to, agricultural, animal husbandry, 
butchering, food processing, marketing, scientific, research, medical, zoological, 
exhibition, competitive, hunting, trapping, fishing, wildlife management, or pest 
control practices or the authorized practice of veterinary medicine nor to limit 
in any way the authority or duty of the Department of Agriculture, Department 
of Natural Resources, any county board of health, any law enforcement officer, 
dog, animal, or rabies control officer, humane society, veterinarian, or private 
landowner protecting his or her property. 
(f)(1) Nothing in this Code section shall be construed as prohibiting a 
person from: 
(A) Defending his or her person or property, or the person or property of 
another, from injury or damage being caused by an animal; or 
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(B) Injuring or killing an animal reasonably believed to constitute a threat 
for injury or damage to any property, livestock, or poultry. 
 
HAWAII STATUTES 
§ 711-1109 CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
(2) Subsection (1)(a), (b), (d), (e) and the following subsection (3) are not 
applicable to accepted veterinary practices and to activities carried on for 
scientific research governed by standards of accepted educational or medicinal 
practices. 
§ 711-1109.03 CRUELTY TO ANIMALS; FIGHTING DOGS 
(2) Nothing in this section shall prohibit any of the following:(a) The use of 
dogs in the management of livestock by the owner of the livestock or the 
owner’s employees or agents or other persons in lawful custody thereof;(b) The 
use of dogs in hunting wildlife including game; or(c) The training of dogs or the 
use of equipment in the training of dogs for any purpose not prohibited by law.* 
 
IDAHO STATUTES 
§ 25-3506 EXHIBITION OF COCKFIGHTS 
Every person who participates in a public or private display of combat 
between two (2) or more gamecocks in which the fighting, killing, maiming or 
injuring of gamecocks is a significant feature is guilty of a misdemeanor and 
shall, upon conviction, be punished in accordance with section 25-3520A, Idaho 
Code. Nothing in this section prohibits any customary practice of breeding or 
rearing game fowl, regardless of the subsequent uses of said game fowl. 
§ 25-3507 EXHIBITION OF DOGFIGHTS 
Every person who participates in a public or private display of combat 
between two (2) or more dogs in which the fighting, killing, maiming or injuring 
of dogs is a significant feature is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon 
conviction, be punished in accordance with section 25-3520A, Idaho Code. 
Nothing in this section prohibits demonstrations of the hunting, herding, 
working or tracking skills of dogs or the lawful use of dogs for hunting, herding, 
working, tracking or self and property protection. 
 
ILLINOIS COMPILED STATUTES 
CH. 510 § 70/3.03: ANIMAL TORTURE 
(b) For the purposes of this Section, “animal torture” does not include any 
death, harm, or injury caused to any animal by any of the following activities: 
(1) any hunting, fishing, trapping, or other activity allowed under the 
Wildlife Code . . . , the Wildlife Habitat Management Areas Act . . . , or the Fish 
and Aquatic Life Code; 
(2) any alteration or destruction of any animal done by any person or unit of 
government pursuant to statute, ordinance, court order, or the direction of a 
licensed veterinarian; 
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(3) any alteration or destruction of any animal by any person for any 
legitimate purpose, including, but not limited to: castration, culling, declawing, 
defanging, ear cropping, euthanasia, gelding, grooming, neutering, polling, 
shearing, shoeing, slaughtering, spaying, tail docking, and vivisection 
510 ILCS 70/3.13: NORMAL HUSBANDRY PRACTICES; CONSTRUCTION WITH 
OTHER ACTSNothing in this Act affects normal, good husbandry practices 
utilized by any person in the production of food, companion or work animals, or 
in the extermination of undesirable pests. 
 
INDIANA CODE 
§ 35-46-3-12 INTENTIONALLY BEATING AN ANIMAL 
(c) It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that the accused 
person: 
(1) reasonably believes the conduct was necessary to: 
(A) prevent injury to the accused person or another person; 
(B) protect the property of the accused person from destruction or 
substantial damage; or 
(C) prevent a seriously injured vertebrate animal from prolonged suffering; 
or 
(2) engaged in a reasonable and recognized act of training, handling, or 
disciplining the vertebrate animal. 
§ 35-46-3-11.5 INTERFERENCE WITH ASSISTANCE TO IMPAIRED PERSONS; 
DEFENSES 
(d) It is a defense that the accused person: 
(1) engaged in a reasonable act of training, handling, or disciplining the 
service animal; or 
(2) reasonably believed the conduct was necessary to prevent injury to the 
accused person or another person. 
§ 35-46-3-5 EXEMPT ACTIVITIES; AUTHORIZATION FOR DESTRUCTION OF 
ANIMAL BY ELECTROCUTION 
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) through (c), this chapter does not 
apply to the following: 
(1) Fishing, hunting, trapping, or other conduct authorized under IC 14-22. 
(3) Veterinary practices authorized by standards adopted under IC 15-5-1.1- 
8. 
(4) Conduct authorized by a local ordinance. 
(5) Acceptable farm management practices. 
(6) Conduct authorized by the Indiana Meat and Poultry Inspection and 
Humane Slaughter Act, IC 15-2.1-24, and rules adopted under IC 15-2.1-24 for 
state or federally inspected livestock slaughtering facilities. 
(7) A research facility registered with the United States Department of 
Agriculture under the federal Animal Welfare Act (7 U.S.C. 2131 et seq.). 
(8) Destruction of a vertebrate defined as a pest under IC 15-3-3.6-2(22). 
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(c) Destruction of an animal by electrocution is authorized under this section 
only if it is conducted by a person who is engaged in an acceptable farm 
management practice, by a research facility registered with the United States 
Department of Agriculture under the Animal Welfare Act, or for the animal 
disease diagnostic laboratory established under IC 15-2.1-5-1, a research facility 




§ 717B.2. ANIMAL ABUSE 
A person is guilty of animal abuse if the person intentionally injures, maims, 
disfigures, or destroys an animal owned by another person, in any manner, 
including intentionally poisoning the animal. A person guilty of animal abuse is 
guilty of an aggravated misdemeanor. This section shall not apply to any of the 
following: 
1. A person acting with the consent of the person owning the animal, unless 
the action constitutes animal neglect as provided in section 717B.3. 
2. A person acting to carry out an order issued by a court. 
3. A licensed veterinarian practicing veterinary medicine as provided in 
chapter 169. 
4. A person acting in order to carry out another provision of law which 
allows the conduct. 
5. A person taking, hunting, trapping, or fishing for a wild animal as 
provided in chapter 481A. 
11. An institution, as defined in section 145B.1, or a research facility, as 
defined in section 162.2, provided that the institution or research facility performs 
functions within the scope of accepted practices and disciplines associated with 
the institution or research facility. 
 
KANSAS STATUTES 
§ 21-4310. CRUELTY TO ANIMALS. 
(b) The provisions of this section shall not apply to: 
(1) Normal or accepted veterinary practices; 
(2) bona fide experiments carried on by commonly recognized research 
facilities; 
(3) killing, attempting to kill, trapping, catching or taking of any animal in 
accordance with the provisions of chapter 32 or chapter 47 of the Kansas 
Statutes Annotated; 
(4) rodeo practices accepted by the rodeo cowboys’ association; 
(5) the humane killing of an animal which is diseased or disabled beyond 
recovery for any useful purpose, or the humane killing of animals for 
population control, by the owner thereof or the agent of such owner residing 
outside of a city or the owner thereof within a city if no animal shelter, pound or 
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licensed veterinarian is within the city, or by a licensed veterinarian at the 
request of the owner thereof, or by any officer or agent of an incorporated 
humane society, the operator of an animal shelter or pound, a local or state 
health officer or a licensed veterinarian three business days following the 
receipt of any such animal at such society, shelter or pound; 
(6) with respect to farm animals, normal or accepted practices of animal 
husbandry; 
(7) the killing of any animal by any person at any time which may be found 
outside of the owned or rented property of the owner or custodian of such 
animal and which is found injuring or posing a threat to any person, farm 
animal or property; 
(8) an animal control officer trained by a licensed veterinarian in the use of 
a tranquilizer gun, using such gun with the appropriate dosage for the size of the 
animal, when such animal is vicious or could not be captured after reasonable 
attempts using other methods; or 
(9) laying an equine down for medical or identification purposes. 
 
KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES 
§ 525.130 CRUELTY TO ANIMALS IN THE SECOND DEGREE; EXEMPTIONS 
(2) Nothing in this section shall apply to the killing of animals: 
(a) Pursuant to a license to hunt, fish, or trap; 
(b) Incident to the processing as food or for other commercial purposes; 
(c) For humane purposes; 
(d) For veterinary, agricultural, spaying or neutering, or cosmetic purposes; 
(e) For purposes relating to sporting activities, including but not limited to 
horse racing at organized races and training for organized races, organized 
horse shows, or other animal shows; 
(f) For bona fide animal research activities of institutions of higher education; 
or a business entity registered with the United States Department of Agriculture 
under the Animal Welfare Act or subject to other federal laws governing animal 
research; 
(i) For animal or pest control; or 
(j) For any other purpose authorized by law. 
(3) Activities of animals engaged in hunting, field trials, dog training other 
than training a dog to fight for pleasure or profit, and other activities authorized 
either by a hunting license or by the Department of Fish and Wildlife shall not 
constitute a violation of this section. 
§ 525.135 TORTURE OF DOG OR CAT 
(4) Nothing in this section shall apply to the killing or injuring of a dog or 
cat: 
(a) In accordance with a license to hunt, fish, or trap; 
(b) For humane purposes; 
(c) For veterinary, agricultural, spaying or neutering, or cosmetic purposes; 
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(d) For purposes relating to sporting activities including but not limited to 
training for organized dog or cat shows, or other animal shows in which a dog or 
a cat, or both, participate; 
(e) For bona fide animal research activities, using dogs or cats, of institutions 
of higher education; or a business entity registered with the United States 
Department of Agriculture under the Animal Welfare Act or subject to other 
federal laws governing animal research; 
(h) For animal or pest control; or 
(i) For any other purpose authorized by law. 
(5) Activities of animals engaged in hunting, field trials, dog training other 
than training a dog to fight for pleasure or profit, and other activities authorized 
either by a hunting license or by the Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources 
shall not constitute a violation of this section. 
 
LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES 
§ 14:102.1 CRUELTY TO ANIMALS; SIMPLE AND AGGRAVATED 
C. This Section shall not apply to the lawful hunting or trapping of wildlife 
as provided by law,* herding of domestic animals, accepted veterinary practices, 
and activities carried on for scientific or medical research governed by accepted 
standards.§ 14:102.5 Dogfighting; training and possession of dogs for fighting 
E. Nothing in this Section shall prohibit any of the following activities:(1) 
The use of dogs for hunting. (2) The use of dogs for management of livestock by 
the owner, his employees or agents, or any other person having lawful custody 
of livestock.(3) The training of dogs or the possession or use of equipment in 
the training of dogs for any purpose not prohibited by law.(4) The possessing or 
owning of dogs with ears cropped or otherwise surgically altered for cosmetic 
purposes. 
 
MAINE REVISED STATUTES 
Tit. 7, § 4011 CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
1-A. Animal cruelty. Except as provided in paragraphs A and B, a person is 
guilty of cruelty to animals if that person kills or attempts to kill a cat or dog. 
A. A licensed veterinarian or a person certified under Title 17, section 1042 
may kill a cat or dog according to the methods of euthanasia under Title 17, 
chapter 42, subchapter IV. 
B. A person who owns a cat or dog, or the owner’s agent, may kill that 
owner’s 
cat or dog by shooting with a firearm provided the following conditions are 
met. 
(1) The shooting is performed by a person 18 years of age or older using a 
weapon and ammunition of suitable caliber and other characteristics to produce 
instantaneous death by a single shot. 
(2) Death is instantaneous. 
09__REPPY.DOC 7/20/2007  9:38 AM 
308 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:255 
(3) Maximum precaution is taken to protect the general public, employees 
and other animals. 
(4) Any restraint of the cat or dog during the shooting does not cause undue 
suffering to the cat or dog. 
2. Affirmative defenses. It is an affirmative defense to this section that: 
A. The conduct was performed by a licensed veterinarian or was a part of 
scientific research governed by accepted standards 
 
MARYLAND CODE 
§ 10-603. APPLICATION OF §§ 10-601 THROUGH 10-608 
Sections 10-601 through 10-608 of this subtitle do not apply to: 
(1) customary and normal veterinary and agricultural husbandry practices 
including dehorning, castration, tail docking, and limit feeding; 
(2) research conducted in accordance with protocols approved by an animal 
care and use committee, as required under the federal Animal Welfare Act or the 
federal Health Research Extension Act 
(3) an activity that may cause unavoidable physical pain to an animal, 
including food processing, pest elimination, animal training, and hunting, if the 
person performing the activity uses the most humane method reasonably 
available; or 
(4) normal human activities in which the infliction of pain to an animal is 
purely incidental and unavoidable. 
 
MICHIGAN COMPILED LAWS 
§ 750.49. ANIMALS; FIGHTING, BAITING, OR SHOOTING; DOGS TRAINED FOR 
FIGHTING; APPLICATION 
(15) Subsections (8) to (14) do not apply to any of the following: 
(a) A dog trained or used for fighting, or the first or second generation 
offspring of a dog trained or used for fighting, that is used by a law enforcement 
agency of the state or a county, city, village, or township. 
(b) A certified leader dog recognized and trained by a national guide dog 
association for the blind or for persons with disabilities. 
(c) A corporation licensed under the private security guard act of 1968, 1968 
PA 330, MCL 338.1051 to 338.1085, when a dog trained or used for fighting, or 
the first or second generation offspring of a dog trained or used for fighting, is 
used in accordance with the private security guard act of 1968, 1968 PA 330, 
MCL 338.1051 to 338.1085. 
(22) This section does not apply to conduct that is permitted by and is in 
compliance with any of the following: 
(a) Part 401 (wildlife conservation) of the natural resources and 
environmental protection act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.40101 to 324.40119. 
(b) Part 435 (hunting and fishing licensing) of the natural resources and 
environmental protection act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.43501 to 324.44106. 
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(c) Part 427 (breeders and dealers) of the natural resources and 
environmental protection act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.42701 to 324.42714.(d) 
Part 417 (private shooting preserves) of the natural resources and 
environmental protection act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.41701 to 324.41712. 
§ 750.50. DEFINITIONS; CRIMES AGAINST ANIMALS, CRUEL TREATMENT, 
ABANDONMENT, FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE CARE; PENALTIES, 
PAYMENT OF COSTS; EXCEPTIONS 
(8) This section does not prohibit the lawful killing or other use of an 
animal, including, but not limited to, the following: 
(a) Fishing. 
(b) Hunting, trapping, or wildlife control regulated pursuant to the natural 
resources and environmental protection act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.101 to 
324.90106. 
(c) Horse racing. 
(d) The operation of a zoological park or aquarium. 
(e) Pest or rodent control. 
(f) Farming or a generally accepted animal husbandry or farming practice 
involving livestock. 
(h) Scientific research pursuant to 1969 PA 224, MCL 287.381 to 287.395. 
(i) Scientific research pursuant to sections 2226, 2671, 2676, and 7333 of the 
public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.2226, 333.2671, 333.2676, and 
333.7333. 
§ 750.50B. WILLFULLY AND MALICIOUSLY KILLING OR INJURING ANIMALS; 
ADMINISTERING POISON TO ANIMALS; PUNISHMENT, COSTS OF ANIMAL CARE; 
PROBATION, NEED FOR COUNSELING, RELINQUISHMENT OF ANIMALS; 
EXCEPTIONS 
(7) This section does not prohibit the lawful killing of livestock* or a 
customary animal husbandry or farming practice involving livestock. As used in 
this subsection, “livestock” has the meaning attributed to the term in the animal 
industry act of 1987, Act No. 466 of the Public Acts of 1988, being sections 
287.701 to 287.747 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. 
(8) This section does not prohibit the lawful killing of an animal pursuant to 
any of the following:**(a) Fishing.(b) Hunting, trapping, or wildlife control 
regulated pursuant to part 401 (wildlife conservation) of the natural resources 
and environmental protection act, Act No. 451 of the Public Acts of 1994, being 
sections 324.40101 to 324.40119 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, and orders 
issued under that act.(c) Pest or rodent control regulated pursuant to part 83 
(pesticide control) of Act No. 451 of the Public Acts of 1994, being sections 
324.8301 to 324.8336 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. 
(9) This section does not prohibit the lawful*** killing or use of an animal 
for scientific research pursuant to any of the following or a rule promulgated 
pursuant to any of the following:(a) Act No. 224 of the Public Acts of 1969, 
being sections 287.381 to 287.395 of the Michigan Compiled Laws [authorizing 
use of dogs and cats in research].(b) Sections 2226, 2671, 2676, 7109, and 7333 of 
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the public health code, Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of 1978, being sections 
333.2226, 333.2671, 333.2676, 333.7109, and 333.7333 of the Michigan Compiled 




§ 97-41-19. DOG FIGHTS 
(4) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall prohibit any of the 
following: 
(a) The use of dogs in the management of livestock, by the owner of such 
livestock or other persons in lawful custody thereof; 
(b) The use of dogs in lawful hunting; and 
(c) The training of dogs for any purpose not prohibited by law. 
§ 97-41-23. INJURY AND KILLING OF PUBLIC SERVICE ANIMALS; PENALTIES 




§ 578.007. ACTS AND FACILITIES TO WHICH SECTIONS 578.005 TO 578.023 
DO NOT APPLY 
The provisions of sections 578.005 to 578.023 shall not apply to: 
(1) Care or treatment performed by a licensed veterinarian within the 
provisions of chapter 340, RSMo; 
(2) Bona fide scientific experiments; 
(3) Hunting, fishing, or trapping as allowed by chapter 252, RSMo, including 
all practices and privileges as allowed under the Missouri Wildlife Code; 
(4) Facilities and publicly funded zoological parks currently in compliance 
with the federal “Animal Welfare Act” as amended;* 
(5) Rodeo practices currently accepted by the Professional Rodeo Cowboy’s 
Association; 
(6) The killing of an animal by the owner thereof, the agent of such owner, 
or by a veterinarian at the request of the owner thereof; 
(7) The lawful, humane killing of an animal by an animal control officer, the 
operator of an animal shelter, a veterinarian, or law enforcement or health 
official; 
(8) With respect to farm animals, normal or accepted practices of animal 
husbandry; 
(9) The killing of an animal by any person at any time if such animal is 
outside of the owned or rented property of the owner or custodian of such 
animal and the animal is injuring any person or farm animal but shall not 
include police or guard dogs while working; 
(10) The killing of house or garden pests; or 
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(11) Field trials, training and hunting practices as accepted by the 
Professional Houndsmen of Missouri. 
§ 578.025 DOGS, FIGHTING, TRAINING TO FIGHT OR INJURING FOR 
AMUSEMENT OR GAIN, PENALTY—SPECTATOR, PENALTY 
3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit: 
(1) The use of dogs in the management of livestock by the owner of such 
livestock or his employees or agents or other persons in lawful custody of such 
livestock; 
(2) The use of dogs in hunting; or 
(3) The training of dogs or the use of equipment in the training of dogs for 
any purpose not prohibited by law.* 
 
MONTANA STATUTES 
§ 45-8-211. CRUELTY TO ANIMALS—EXCEPTIONS 
(4) This section does not prohibit: 
(a) a person humanely destroying an animal for just cause; 
(b) the use of commonly accepted agricultural and livestock practices on 
livestock; 
(c) rodeo activities that meet humane standards of the professional rodeo 
cowboys association; 
(d) lawful fishing, hunting, and trapping activities;* 
(e) lawful wildlife management practices; 
(f) lawful scientific or agricultural research or teaching that involves the use 
of animals;* 
(g) services performed by a licensed veterinarian; 
(h) lawful control of rodents and predators and other lawful animal damage 
control activities; or 
(i) accepted training and discipline methods. 
 
NEBRASKA STATUTES 
§ 28-1013. SECTIONS; EXEMPTIONS. 
Sections 28-1008 to 28-1017 shall not apply to: 
(1) Care or treatment of an animal by a veterinarian licensed under the 
Nebraska Veterinary Practice Act; 
(2) Commonly accepted care or treatment of a police animal by a law 
enforcement officer in the normal course of his or her duties; 
(3) Research activity carried on by any research facility currently meeting the 
standards of the federal Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. 2131 et seq., as such act 
existed on January 1, 2003; 
(4) Commonly accepted practices of hunting, fishing, or trapping; 
(5) Commonly accepted practices occurring in conjunction with rodeos, 
animal racing, or pulling contests; 
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(6) Humane killing of an animal by the owner or by his or her agent or a 
veterinarian upon the owner’s request; 
(7) Commonly accepted practices of animal husbandry with respect to farm 
animals, including their transport from one location to another and nonnegligent 
actions taken by personnel or agents of the Nebraska Department of Agriculture 
or the United States Department of Agriculture in the performance of duties 
prescribed by law; 
(8) Use of reasonable force against an animal, other than a police animal, 
which is working, including killing, capture, or restraint, if the animal is outside 
the owned or rented property of its owner or custodian and is injuring or posing 
an immediate threat to any person or other animal; 
(9) Killing of house or garden pests; 
(10) Commonly followed practices occurring in conjunction with the 
slaughter of animals for food or byproducts; and 
(11) Commonly accepted animal training practices. 
 
NEVADA REVISED STATUTES 
§ 206.150. KILLING, MAIMING, DISFIGURING OR POISONING ANIMAL OF 
ANOTHER PERSON; KILLING ESTRAY OR LIVESTOCK 
3. The provisions of subsection 1 do not apply to any person who kills a dog 
pursuant to NRS 575.020 [relating to vicious animals running at large]. 
§ 574.070. INSTIGATING OR WITNESSING FIGHTS BETWEEN BIRDS OR 
OTHER ANIMALS UNLAWFUL; PENALTIES; EXCEPTIONS 
7. This section does not prohibit the use of dogs or birds for: 
(a) The management of livestock by the owner thereof, his employees or 
agents or any other person in the lawful custody of the livestock; or 
(b) Hunting as permitted by law.* 
§ 574.100. OVERDRIVING, TORTURING, INJURING OR ABANDONING 
ANIMALS; FAILURE TO PROVIDE PROPER SUSTENANCE; PENALTIES; 
EXCEPTIONS 
5. The provisions of this section do not apply with respect to an injury to or 
the death of an animal that occurs accidentally in the normal course of: 
(a) Carrying out the activities of a rodeo or livestock show; or 
(b) Operating a ranch. 
§ 574.105. MISTREATMENT OF POLICE ANIMAL AND INTERFERENCE WITH 
DUTIES OF POLICE ANIMAL OR HANDLER UNLAWFUL; PENALTIES; EXCEPTION 
3. The provisions of this section do not prohibit a euthanasia technician 
licensed pursuant to chapter 638 of NRS, a peace officer or a veterinarian from 
euthanizing a police animal in an emergency if the police animal is critically 
wounded and would otherwise endure undue suffering and pain. 
§ 574.150. POISONING OR ATTEMPTING TO POISON ANIMALS UNLAWFUL; 
PENALTIES 
3. This section does not prohibit the destruction of noxious animals. 
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§ 574.340. APPLICABILITY 
The provisions of NRS 574.210 to 574.510, inclusive, do not apply to: 
1. The exhibition, production, marketing or disposal of any livestock, 
poultry, fish or other agricultural commodity. 
2. Activities for which a license is required by the provisions of chapter 466 
of NRS [ regulating horse racing]. 
3. The housing of domestic cats or dogs kept as pets or cared for, without 
remuneration other than payment for reasonable expenses relating to the care 
of the cats or dogs, on behalf of another person in a home environment. 
4. The exhibition of dogs or cats. 
 
NEW HAMPSHIRE REVISED STATUTES 
§ 644:8 CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
III. A person is guilty of a misdemeanor for a first offense, and of a class B 
felony for a second or subsequent offense, who: 
(a) Without lawful authority negligently deprives or causes to be deprived 
any animal in his possession or custody necessary care, sustenance or shelter; 
V. A veterinarian licensed to practice in the state shall be held harmless 
from either criminal or civil liability for any decisions made for services 
rendered under the provisions of this section or RSA 435:11-16. Such a 
veterinarian is, therefore, under this paragraph, protected from a lawsuit for his 
part in an investigation of cruelty to animals. 
NEW JERSEY STATUTES 
§ 4:22-16 PERMITTED ACTIVITIES 
Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to prohibit or interfere 
with: 
a. Properly conducted scientific experiments performed under the authority of 
the Department of Health or the United States Department of Agriculture. Those 
departments may authorize the conduct of such experiments or investigations by 
agricultural stations and schools maintained by the State or federal government, 
or by medical societies, universities, colleges and institutions incorporated or 
authorized to do business in this State and having among their corporate 
purposes investigation into the causes, nature, prevention and cure of diseases in 
men and animals; and may for cause revoke such authority; 
b. The killing or disposing of an animal or creature by virtue of the order of 
a constituted authority of the State; 
c. The shooting or taking of game or game fish in such manner and at such 
times as is allowed or provided by the laws of this State; 
d. The training or engaging of a dog to accomplish a task or participate in an 
activity or exhibition designed to develop the physical or mental characteristics of 
that dog. These activities shall be carried out in accordance with the practices, 
guidelines or rules established by an organization founded for the purpose of 
promoting and enhancing working dog activities or exhibitions; in a manner 
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which does not adversely affect the health or safety of the dog; and may include 
avalanche warning, guide work, obedience work, carting, dispatching, freight 
racing, packing, sled dog racing, sledding, tracking, and weight pull 
demonstrations; 
e. The raising, keeping, care, treatment, marketing, and sale of domestic 
livestock in accordance with the standards developed and adopted therefor 
pursuant to subsection a. of section 1 of P.L.1995, c. 311 (C. 4:22-16.1); and 
f. The killing or disposing, by a reasonable or commercially acceptable 
method or means, of a Norway or brown rat (Rattus norvegicus), black rat 
(Rattus rattus), or house mouse (Mus musculus) by any person, or with the 
permission or at the direction of that person, while the animal is on property 
either owned or leased by, or otherwise under the control of, that person, 
provided that the animal is not a pet 
 
NEW MEXICO STATUTES 
§ 30-18-1. CRUELTY TO ANIMALS; EXTREME CRUELTY TO ANIMALS; 
PENALTIES; EXCEPTIONS 
I. The provisions of this section do not apply to: 
(1) fishing, hunting, falconry, taking and trapping, as provided in Chapter 17 
NMSA 1978; 
(2) the practice of veterinary medicine, as provided in Chapter 61, Article 14 
NMSA 1978; 
(3) rodent or pest control, as provided in Chapter 77, Article 15 NMSA 
1978; 
(4) the treatment of livestock and other animals used on farms and ranches 
for the production of food, fiber or other agricultural products, when the 
treatment is in accordance with commonly accepted agricultural animal 
husbandry practices; 
(5) the use of commonly accepted Mexican and American rodeo practices, 
unless otherwise prohibited by law; 
(6) research facilities licensed pursuant to the provisions of 7 U.S.C. Section 
2136, except when knowingly operating outside provisions, governing the 
treatment of animals, of a research or maintenance protocol approved by the 
institutional animal care and use committee of the facility; or 
(7) other similar activities not otherwise prohibited by law.* 
 
NEW YORK AGRICULTURE AND MARKETS LAW 
§ 353. OVERDRIVING, TORTURING AND INJURING ANIMALS; FAILURE TO 
PROVIDE PROPER SUSTENANCE 
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prohibit or interfere with 
any properly conducted scientific tests, experiments or investigations, involving 
the use of living animals, performed or conducted in laboratories or institutions, 
which are approved for these purposes by the state commissioner of health. The 
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state commissioner of health shall prescribe the rules under which such 
approvals shall be granted, including therein standards regarding the care and 
treatment of any such animals. Such rules shall be published and copies thereof 
conspicuously posted in each such laboratory or institution. The state 
commissioner of health or his duly authorized representative shall have the 
power to inspect such laboratories or institutions to insure compliance with such 
rules and standards. Each such approval may be revoked at any time for failure 
to comply with such rules and in any case the approval shall be limited to a 
period not exceeding one year. 
§ 353-a 
2. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit or 
interfere in any way with anyone lawfully engaged in hunting, trapping, or 
fishing, as provided in article eleven of the environmental conservation law, the 
dispatch of rabid or diseased animals, as provided in article twenty-one of the 
public health law, or the dispatch of animals posing a threat to human safety or 
other animals, where such action is otherwise legally authorized, or any 
properly conducted scientific tests, experiments, or investigations involving the 
use of living animals, performed or conducted in laboratories or institutions 
approved for such purposes by the commissioner of health pursuant to section 
three hundred fifty-three of this article.* 
 
NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE 
§ 36-21.1-02 OVERWORKING, MISTREATING, OR ABANDONING ANIMALS 
8. No person may cage any animal for public display purposes unless the 
display cage is constructed of solid material on three sides to protect the caged 
animal from the elements, and unless the horizontal dimension of each side of 
the cage is at least four times the length of the caged animal. This subsection 
does not apply to the North Dakota state fair association, to agricultural fair 
associations, to any agricultural display of caged animals by any political 
subdivision, or to district, regional, or national educational livestock or poultry 
exhibitions. Zoos which have been approved by the health district or the 
governing body of the political subdivision which has jurisdiction over the zoos 
are exempt from this subsection. 
 
OHIO REVISED CODE 
§ 959.02 INJURING ANIMALS 
No person shall maliciously, or willfully, and without the consent of the 
owner, kill or injure a horse, mare, foal, filly, jack, mule, sheep, goat, cow, steer, 
bull, heifer, ass, ox, swine, dog, cat, or other domestic animal that is the 
property of another. This section does not apply to a licensed veterinarian 
acting in an official capacity. 
§ 959.131 PROHIBITIONS CONCERNING COMPANION ANIMALS 
(D) Divisions (B) and (C) of this section do not apply to any of the 
following: 
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(1) A companion animal used in scientific research conducted by an 
institution in accordance with the federal animal welfare act and related 
regulations; 
(2) The lawful practice of veterinary medicine by a person who has been 
issued a license, temporary permit, or registration certificate to do so under 
Chapter 4741. of the Revised Code;* 
(3) Dogs being used or intended for use for hunting or field trial purposes, 
provided that the dogs are being treated in accordance with usual and commonly 
accepted practices for the care of hunting dogs; 
(4) The use of common training devices, if the companion animal is being 
treated in accordance with usual and commonly accepted practices for the 
training of animals; 
 
OKLAHOMA STATUTES 
TIT. 21 § 1692.9. EXEMPTION 
Nothing in this act shall prohibit any of the following: 
A. Hunting birds or fowl in accordance with Oklahoma regulation or 
statute, including but not limited to the sport of hunting game with trained 
raptors. 
B. Agricultural production of fowl for human consumption. 
TIT. 21 § 1699.2 EXEMPTIONS 
Nothing in this act shall prohibit any of the following: 
1. The use of dogs in hunting as permitted by the Game and Fish Code and 
by the rules and regulations adopted by the Oklahoma Wildlife Conservation 
Commission; 
2. The use of dogs in the management of livestock by the owner of such 
livestock or his employees or agents or other persons in lawful custody thereof; 
3. The training of dogs or the use of equipment in the training of dogs for 
any purpose not prohibited by law;* or 
4. The raising, breeding, keeping or training of dogs or the use of equipment 
for the raising, breeding, keeping or training of dogs for sale or show purposes. 
 
OREGON REVISED STATUTES 
§ 167.315. ANIMAL ABUSE IN THE SECOND DEGREE 
(2) Any practice of good animal husbandry is not a violation of this section. 
§ 167.320. ANIMAL ABUSE IN THE FIRST DEGREE 
(2) Any practice of good animal husbandry is not a violation of this section. 
§ 167.335. EXEMPTION FROM ORS 167.315 TO 167.333 
Unless gross negligence can be shown, the provisions of ORS 167.315 to 
167.333 do not apply to: 
(1) The treatment of livestock being transported by owner or common carrier; 
(2) Animals involved in rodeos or similar exhibitions; 
(3) Commercially grown poultry; 
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(4) Animals subject to good animal husbandry practices; 
(5) The killing of livestock according to the provisions of ORS 603.065; 
(6) Animals subject to good veterinary practices as described in ORS 686.030; 
(7) Lawful fishing, hunting and trapping activities; 
(8) Wildlife management practices under color of law; 
(9) Lawful scientific or agricultural research or teaching that involves the use 
of animals; 
(10) Reasonable activities undertaken in connection with the control of 
vermin or pests; and 
(11) Reasonable handling and training techniques. 
 
PENNSYLVANIA CONSOLIDATED STATUTES 
TIT. 3 § 2387. INAPPLICABILITY OF PENAL CRUELTY TO ANIMALS STATUTES 
No action taken by the department [of Agriculture] or decision not to act 
made by the department or condition or action required of another by the 
written instruction of the department shall be construed as cruelty to animals 
under any penal statute of this Commonwealth provided that such an action, 
decision or condition is taken, made or required under the authority of this 
chapter and its attendant regulations. 
TIT. 18 § 5511. CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
(a)(3) This subsection shall not apply to: 
(iii) such reasonable activity as may be undertaken in connection with 
vermin control or pest control. 
(H.1) Animal fighting 
This subsection shall not apply to activity undertaken in a normal agricultural 
operation. 
 
RHODE ISLAND STATUTES 
§ 4-1-3 UNNECESSARY CRUELTY 
(b) The substances proscribed by subsection (a) do not include any drug 
having curative and therapeutic effect for disease in animals and which is 
prepared and intended for veterinary use. 
§ 4-1-5 MALICIOUS INJURY TO OR KILLING OF ANIMALS 
(b) This section shall not apply to licensed hunters during hunting season or 
a licensed business killing animals for human consumption. 
 
SOUTH CAROLINA CODE 
§ 47-1-40. ILL-TREATMENT OF ANIMALS GENERALLY. 
(C) This section does not apply to fowl, accepted animal husbandry 
practices of farm operations and the training of animals, the practice of 
veterinary medicine, agricultural practices, forestry and silvacultural practices, 
wildlife management practices, or activity authorized by Title 50 [relating to 
fishing and hunting]. 
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§ 47-1-70. ABANDONMENT OF ANIMALS; PENALTIES; HUNTING DOG 
EXCEPTION 
(C) A hunting dog that is positively identifiable in accordance with Section 
47-3-510 or Section 47-3-530 is exempt from this section. 
 
SOUTH DAKOTA CONSOLIDATED LAWS 
§ 40-1-16. SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTS NOT PROHIBITED—GUIDELINES 
Nothing in this chapter may be construed to interfere with any properly 
conducted scientific experiments or investigations, which experiments or 
investigations are performed by personnel following guidelines established by the 
National Institute of Health and the United States Department of Agriculture. 
§ 40-1-17 EXEMPTIONS FROM CHAPTER—DESTRUCTION OF DANGEROUS 
ANIMALS 
The acts and conduct of persons who are lawfully engaged in any of the 
activities authorized by Title 41 [relating to hunting and fishing] or laws for the 
destruction or control of certain animals known to be dangerous or injurious to 
life, limb, or property, and persons who properly kill any animal used for food 
and sport hunting, trapping, and fishing as authorized by the South Dakota 
Department of Game, Fish and Parks, are exempt from the provisions of this 
chapter. 
§ 40-1-20. POISONING ANIMAL OF ANOTHER—PENALTY—EXCEPTIONS 
Except as specifically provided for in this chapter, no person may 
intentionally administer poison to any animal which belongs to another, nor 
intentionally expose any poisonous substance so that it may be taken by an 
animal which belongs to another. A violation of this section is a Class 1 
misdemeanor. This section may not be construed to prevent euthanasia by a 
licensed veterinarian with proper authority from the animal’s owner nor may it 
prevent acts of euthanasia authorized by this chapter. This section may not be 
construed to prevent animal control activities conducted by municipalities or 
counties, separately or through contract with a humane society, in accordance 
with chapters 36-12 and 34-20B. 
§ 40-1-21. KILLING OR INJURING ANIMAL OF ANOTHER—PENALTY—
EXCEPTIONS 
No person may intentionally kill any animal of any age or value, the 
property of another, nor intentionally injure any such animal. A violation of this 
section is a Class 1 misdemeanor. This section may not be construed to prevent 
euthanasia by a licensed veterinarian with proper authority from the animal’s 
owner nor may it prevent acts of euthanasia authorized by this chapter. This 
section may not be construed to prohibit euthanasia conducted by the 
municipality or under a municipality’s animal control activities. This section 
may not be construed to prohibit activities conducted under chapter 40-34. 
 
TENNESSEE CODE 
§ 39-14-201 DEFINITIONS 
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(4) “Torture” means every act, omission, or neglect whereby unreasonable 
physical pain, suffering, or death is caused or permitted, but nothing in this part 
shall be construed as prohibiting the shooting of birds or game for the purpose 
of human food or the use of animate targets by incorporated gun clubs. 
§ 39-14-202 CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
(b) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the person was 
engaged in accepted veterinary practices, medical treatment by the owner or with 
the owner’s consent, or bona fide experimentation for scientific research. 
(e)(1) Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting the owner of a 
farm animal or someone acting with the consent of the owner of such animal 
from engaging in usual and customary practices which are accepted by colleges of 
agriculture or veterinary medicine with respect to such animal. 
§ 39-14-203 COCK AND ANIMAL FIGHTING 
(b) It is the legislative intent that the provisions of this section shall not 
apply to the training or use of hunting dogs for sport or to the training or use of 
dogs for law enforcement purposes. 
§ 39-14-212 AGGRAVATED CRUELTY TO ANIMALS; DEFINITIONS; 
PENALTIES 
(c) The provisions of subsection (a) shall not be construed to prohibit or 
interfere with the following endeavors: 
(1) The provisions of this section shall not be construed to change, modify, 
or amend any provision of title 70, involving fish and wildlife; 
(3) The provisions of this section do not apply to equine animals or to 
animals defined as livestock by the provisions of § 39-14-201; 
(4) Dispatching an animal in any manner absent of aggravated cruelty; 
(5) Engaging in lawful hunting, trapping, or fishing activities, including 
activities commonly associated with the hunting of small game as defined in § 70-
1-101(a)(34); 
(8) Performing or conducting bona fide scientific tests, experiments or 
investigations within or for a bona fide research laboratory, facility or institution; 
(9) Performing accepted veterinary medical practices or treatments; 
(11) Engaging, with the consent of the owner of a farm animal, in usual and 
customary practices which are accepted by colleges of agriculture or veterinary 
medicine with respect to such animal; 
 
TEXAS PENAL CODE 
§ 42.09. CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
(b) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the actor was engaged 
in bona fide experimentation for scientific research. 
(h) It is an exception to the application of this section that the conduct 
engaged in by the actor is a generally accepted and otherwise lawful:* 
(1) use of an animal if that use occurs solely for the purpose of: 
(A) fishing, hunting, or trapping; or 
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(B) wildlife control as regulated by state and federal law; or 
(2) animal husbandry or farming practice involving livestock. 
§ 42.10. DOG FIGHTING 
(d) It is a defense to prosecution under Subdivision (1) or (2) of Subsection 
(a) that the actor caused a dog to fight with another dog to protect livestock, 
other property, or a person from the other dog, and for no other purpose. 
 
UTAH CODE 
§ 76-9-301 CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
(5) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the conduct of the 
actor towards the animal was: 
(a) by a licensed veterinarian using accepted veterinary practice; 
(b) directly related to bona fide experimentation for scientific research, 
provided that if the animal is to be destroyed, the manner employed will not be 
unnecessarily cruel unless directly necessary to the veterinary purpose or scientific 
research involved; 
(c) permitted under Section 18-1-3 [relating to dogs attacking other 
animals]; 
(d) by a person who humanely destroys any animal found suffering past 
recovery for any useful purpose; or 
(e) by a person who humanely destroys any apparently abandoned animal 
found on the person’s property. 
§ 76-9-301.1 DOG FIGHTING—TRAINING DOGS FOR FIGHTING—DOG 
FIGHTING EXHIBITIONS 
(5) Nothing in this section prohibits any of the following: 
(a) the use of dogs for management of livestock by the owner, his employees 
or agents, or any other person in the lawful custody of livestock; 
(b) the use of dogs for hunting; or 
(c) the training of dogs or the possession or use of equipment in the training 
of dogs for any purpose not prohibited by law.* 
 
VERMONT STATUTES 
TIT. 13, § 351B CRUELTY TO ANIMALS: SCOPE OF SUBCHAPTER 
This subchapter shall not apply to: 
(1) activities regulated by the department of fish and wildlife pursuant to 
part 4 of Title 10; 
(2) scientific research governed by accepted procedural standards subject to 
review by an institutional animal care and use committee; 
(3) livestock and poultry husbandry practices for raising, management and 
use of animals; 
(4) veterinary medical or surgical procedures; and 
(5) the killing of an animal as provided by sections 3809 and 3545 [both 
dealing with an attacking pet wolf] of Title 20. 
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TIT. 13, § 352B RULES; AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, an affirmative 
defense to prosecution under section 352 or 352a of this title may be raised 
when: 
(1) except for vivisection or research under section 352(7) of this title, the 
defendant was a veterinarian whose conduct conformed to accepted veterinary 
practice for the area, or was a scientist whose conduct was a part of scientific 
research governed by accepted procedural standards subject to review by an 
institutional care and use committee; 
(2) the defendant’s conduct was designed to control or eliminate rodents, 
ants or other common pests on the defendant’s own property; 
(3) the defendant was a person appropriately licensed to utilize pesticides 
under chapter 87 of Title 6; 
(4) the defendant humanely euthanized any animal as a representative of a 
duly organized humane society, animal shelter or town pound according to rules 
of this subchapter, or as a veterinarian destroying animals under chapter 193 or 
sections 3511 and 3513 of Title 20; or 
(5) a state agency was implementing a rabies control program. 
 
VIRGINIA STATUTES 
§ 3.1-796.74. EXCEPTIONS REGARDING VETERINARIANS 
Sections 3.1-796.68 through 3.1-796.73, 3.1-796.78 through 3.1- 796.83:2, 3.1-
796.105 through 3.1-796.108, 3.1-796.120, and 3.1- 796.126:1 through 3.1-
796.126:7 shall not apply to: (i) a place or establishment which is operated under 
the immediate supervision of a duly licensed veterinarian as a hospital or 
boarding establishment where animals are harbored, boarded and cared for 
incident to the treatment, prevention, or alleviation of disease processes during 
the routine practice of the profession of veterinary medicine, or (ii) animals 
boarded under the immediate supervision of a duly licensed veterinarian. 
§ 3.1-796.122. CRUELTY TO ANIMALS; PENALTY 
B. Any person who (i) tortures, willfully inflicts inhumane injury or pain not 
connected with bona fide scientific or medical experimentation, or cruelly and 
unnecessarily beats, maims, mutilates or kills any animal whether belonging to 
himself or another; (ii) sores any equine for any purpose or administers drugs or 
medications to alter or mask such soring for the purpose of sale, show, or 
exhibit of any kind, unless such administration of drugs or medications is under 
the supervision of a licensed veterinarian and solely for therapeutic purposes; 
(iii) instigates, engages in, or in any way furthers any act of cruelty to any 
animal set forth in clause (i); or (iv) causes any of the actions described in 
clauses (i) through (iii), or being the owner of such animal permits such acts to 
be done by another; and has been within five years convicted of a violation of 
this subsection or subsection A, shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony if the current 
violation or any previous violation of this subsection or subsection A resulted in 
the death of an animal or the euthanasia of an animal based on the 
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recommendation of a licensed veterinarian upon determination that such 
euthanasia was necessary due to the condition of the animal, and such condition 
was a direct result of a violation of this subsection or subsection A. 
E. This section shall not prohibit authorized wildlife management activities 
or hunting, fishing or trapping as regulated under other titles of the Code of 
Virginia, including, but not limited to Title 29.1, or to farming activities as 
provided under this title or regulations promulgated thereto.* 
 
WASHINGTON REVISED CODE 
§ 16.52.180 LIMITATIONS ON APPLICATION OF CHAPTER 
No part of this chapter shall be deemed to interfere with any of the laws of 
this state known as the “game laws,” nor be deemed to interfere with the right 
to destroy any venomous reptile or any known as dangerous to life, limb or 
property, or to interfere with the right to kill animals to be used for food or with 
any properly conducted scientific experiments or investigations, which 
experiments or investigations shall be performed only under the authority of the 
faculty of some regularly incorporated college or university of the state of 
Washington or a research facility registered with the United States department of 
agriculture and regulated by 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2131 et seq. 
§ 16.52.185 EXCLUSIONS FROM CHAPTER 
Nothing in this chapter applies to accepted husbandry practices used in the 
commercial raising or slaughtering of livestock or poultry, or products thereof or 
to the use of animals in the normal and usual course of rodeo events or to the 
customary use or exhibiting of animals in normal and usual events at fairs as 
defined in RCW 15.76.120. 
 
WEST VIRGINIA CODE 
§ 19-20-12 DOGS, OTHER ANIMALS AND REPTILES PROTECTED BY LAW; 
UNLAWFUL KILLING THEREOF; AGGRIEVED OWNER’S REMEDY; PENALTIES; 
PENALTIES FOR UNLAWFUL STEALING OF COMPANION ANIMALS 
(a) Any dog which is registered, kept and controlled as provided in this 
article or any dog, cat or other animal or any reptile which is owned, kept and 
maintained as a companion animal by any person, irrespective of age, is 
protected by law; and, except as otherwise authorized by law, any person who 
shall intentionally, knowingly or recklessly kill, injure, poison or in any other 
manner, cause the death or injury of any dog, cat, other animal or any reptile is 
guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be ordered to 
provide public service for not less than thirty nor more than ninety days or fined 
not less than three hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, or both. 
However, this section does not apply to a dog who is killed while attacking a 
person, a companion animal or livestock. 
§ 7-10-4 CRUELTY TO ANIMALS; PENALTIES; EXCLUSIONS 
(h) The provisions of this section do not apply to lawful* acts of hunting, 
fishing, trapping or animal training or farm livestock, poultry, gaming fowl or 
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wildlife kept in private or licensed game farms if kept and maintained according 
to usual and accepted standards of livestock, poultry, gaming fowl or wildlife or 
game farm production and management, nor to humane use of animals or 
activities regulated under and in conformity with the provisions of 7 U.S.C. § 
2131, et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder, as both statutes and 
regulations are in effect on the effective date of this section. 
 
WISCONSIN STATUTES 
§ 951.015. CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION 
(1) This chapter may not be interpreted as controverting any law regulating 
wild animals that are subject to regulation under ch. 169, the taking of wild 
animals, as defined in s. 29.001(90), or the slaughter of animals by persons 
acting under state or federal law. 
§ 951.02. MISTREATING ANIMALS 
No person may treat any animal, whether belonging to the person or 
another, in a cruel manner. This section does not prohibit bona fide experiments 
carried on for scientific research or normal and accepted veterinary practices. 
§ 951.06. USE OF POISONOUS AND CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
No person may expose any domestic animal owned by another to any 
known poisonous substance, any controlled substance included in schedule I, II, 
III, IV or V of ch. 961, or any controlled substance analog of a controlled 
substance included in schedule I or II of ch. 961, whether mixed with meat or 
other food or not, so that the substance is liable to be eaten by the animal and 
for the purpose of harming the animal. This section shall not apply to poison 
used on one’s own premises and designed for the purpose of rodent or pest 
extermination nor to the use of a controlled substance in bona fide experiments 
carried on for scientific research or in accepted veterinary practices. 
§ 951.09. SHOOTING AT CAGED OR STAKED ANIMALS 
(3) This section does not apply to any of the following animals: 




§ 6-3-203 CRUELTY TO ANIMALS; PENALTIES; LIMITATION ON MANNER OF 
DESTRUCTION 
(f) Nothing in subsection (c) of this section may be construed to prohibit: 
(i) The use of dogs in the management of livestock by the owner of the 
livestock, his employees or agents or other persons in lawful custody of the 
livestock; 
(ii) The use of dogs or raptors in hunting; or 
(iii) The training of dogs or raptors or the use of equipment in the training 
of dogs or raptors for any purpose not prohibited by law;* 
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(m) Nothing in subsection (a), (b) or (n) of this section shall be construed to 
prohibit: 
(i) A person from humanely destroying an animal;825;825 
(ii) The use of industry accepted agricultural and livestock practices on 
livestock; 
(iii) Rodeo events, whether the event is performed in a rodeo, jackpot or 
otherwise; or(iv) The hunting, capture or destruction of any predatory 
animal;865;865 or other wildlife in any manner not otherwise prohibited by 
law.* 
